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2133 
The Klein Rule of Decision Puzzle and 
the Self-Dealing Solution 
Evan C. Zoldan* 
Abstract 
Scholars and courts have struggled to make sense of the 
Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Klein, an intriguing 
but enigmatic opinion concerning the limits of Congress’s ability to 
interfere with cases pending before the federal courts. Klein is 
intriguing because its broad and emphatic language suggests 
significant limits on the power of Congress. Klein is enigmatic 
because the Court has never again struck down a statute because of 
Klein or even made clear what principle animates its result. In fact, 
despite reaffirming the existence of a principle based on Klein, the 
Court has repeatedly read it narrowly, suggesting that the principle 
it embodies has not been adequately articulated. This Article argues 
that Klein’s principle is a specific application of a robust 
constitutional tradition that restrains governmental self-dealing. A 
Klein principle restraining governmental self-dealing explains the 
Court’s Klein cases, situates the principle within constitutional 
theory and doctrine, and provides much-needed direction to lower 
courts wrestling with questions about legislative intrusions into 
judicial functions. 
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I. Introduction 
By dividing the power of the federal government among three 
interdependent branches,1 the Constitution sets the lawful 
exercise of power by each branch in tension with the lawful 
exercise of power by the others.2 This Article explores one 
prominent and perennial consequence of this tension. On one 
hand, Congress is empowered to enact statutes that federal courts 
must apply;3 on the other hand, the courts are empowered to decide 
                                                                                                     
 1. See U.S. CONST. arts. I–III (establishing the legislative, executive, and 
judicial branches of the federal government). 
 2. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 693–94 (1988) (noting that the 
Constitution “enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, 
autonomy but reciprocity” (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 
U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (concurring))). 
 3. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall 
be vested in a Congress of the United States.”). 
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cases pending before them.4 Usually, these powers are 
complementary. When Congress writes broad, generally applicable 
statutes, the courts have ample leeway to decide cases pending 
before them by applying the law to the facts of these pending 
cases.5 Conflict arises when Congress enacts a statute so specific 
that it guarantees an outcome in a particular case.6 When it acts 
with this level of specificity, Congress’s lawful power to write rules 
can be indistinguishable from the courts’ prerogative to decide 
cases pending before them.7 
The line between lawmaking and judicial application of law is 
governed by a facet of separation of powers doctrine called the 
Klein “rule of decision” principle.8 The Klein rule of decision 
principle is named for a Reconstruction-era Supreme Court case 
that rebuffed Congress’s attempt to direct a federal court to rule in 
favor of the government in a particular class of cases.9 Klein held, 
in deceptively simple language, that Congress may not prescribe a 
rule of decision for the federal courts in cases pending before 
them.10 The intuitive simplicity of Klein’s rule of decision principle 
has earned it a place in the Federal Courts canon. However, 
although the Court has entertained numerous Klein challenges in 
the 150 years since it was decided, the Court has found no other 
Klein violation nor adequately explained the principle that 
animates its result. Scholars, too, have continued to wrestle with 
                                                                                                     
 4. See id. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be 
vested in one supreme Court, and in . . . inferior Courts.”). 
 5. See JAMES PFANDER, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION 405 (2016) 
(noting that applying rules of decision is precisely what courts do). 
 6. See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction 
of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1373 (1953) 
(inferring a limitation from Article III on Congress’s ability to “tell the court how 
to decide” a case over which it has jurisdiction). 
 7. William D. Araiza, The Trouble with Robertson: Equal Protection, The 
Separation of Powers, and the Line Between Statutory Amendment and Statutory 
Interpretation, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 1055, 1104–05 (1999) (noting the narrow 
space, if any, between writing rules of decision and guaranteeing an outcome). 
 8. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 146 (1871). 
 9. See id. at 147 (holding that Congress may not “prescribe a rule in 
conformity with which the court must deny to itself the jurisdiction” otherwise 
conferred by Congress). 
 10. Id. at 146. 
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the Klein puzzle, although they have never agreed on what Klein 
means or even whether it means anything at all.11  
The Court’s recent opinion in Bank Markazi v. Peterson12 
elucidates how difficult it is to articulate an enforceable Klein rule 
of decision principle.13 Bank Markazi arose out of a lawsuit by 
victims of Iranian-sponsored terrorism to recover damages from 
the country of Iran.14 Because Iran had no assets in the United 
States that could satisfy these judgments, Congress directed the 
federal courts to treat the assets of Bank Markazi, the Central 
Bank of Iran, as the assets of the country of Iran for the purposes 
of the pending lawsuit.15 The effect of the statute was to direct the 
court to find in favor of the claimants, awarding approximately 
$1.75 billion dollars to hundreds of terrorism victims.16 The Court 
                                                                                                     
 11. See generally PETER A. GERANGELOS, THE SEPARATION OF POWERS AND 
LEGISLATIVE INTERFERENCE IN JUDICIAL PROCESS: CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES AND 
LIMITATIONS (2009) [hereinafter GERANGELOS, JUDICIAL PROCESS]; Evan H. 
Caminker, Schiavo and Klein, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 529 (2005); Vicki C. Jackson, 
Suing the Federal Government: Sovereignty, Immunity, and Judicial 
Independence, 35 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 521 (2003); Martin H. Redish & 
Christopher R. Pudelski, Legislative Deception, Separation of Powers, and the 
Democratic Process: Harnessing The Political Theory of United States v. Klein, 
100 NW. U. L. REV. 437 (2006); Amy D. Ronner, Judicial Self-Demise: The Test of 
When Congress Impermissibly Intrudes on Judicial Power After Robertson v. 
Seattle Audubon Society and the Federal Appellate Courts’ Rejection of the 
Separation of Powers Challenges to the New Section of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 1037, 1071–72 (1993); Lawrence G. Sager, Klein’s 
First Principle: A Proposed Solution, 86 GEO. L. J. 2525 (1998); Stephen I. 
Vladeck, Why Klein (Still) Matters: Congressional Deception and the War on 
Terrorism, 5 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 251 (2011); Howard Wasserman, The 
Irrepressible Myth of Klein, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 53 (2011); Gordon G. Young, 
Congressional Regulation of Federal Courts’ Jurisdiction and Processes: United 
States v. Klein Revisited, 1981 WIS. L. REV. 1189 (1981) [hereinafter Young, 
Congressional Regulation]; Gordon G. Young, United States v. Klein, Then and 
Now, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 265 (2012) [hereinafter Young, Klein, Then and Now]. 
 12. 136 S. Ct. 1310 (2016). 
 13. Id. (upholding a statute that favored a party in a pending case). 
 14. See id. at 1319 (describing underlying conduct that gave rise to claims). 
 15. See 22 U.S.C. § 8772(b) (2012) (defining assets subject to execution to 
include assets specifically named in a particular lawsuit); see also Bank Markazi, 
136 S. Ct. at 1320–21 (describing the operation of Iran Threat Reduction and 
Syria Human Rights Act). 
 16. See Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1320–22 (noting that the district court 
ordered the turnover of Bank Markazi’s assets to satisfy outstanding judgments 
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wrestled with the fact that the statute left little, if any, judicial 
work for the court to do, but ultimately upheld it.17 Bank Markazi 
suggests that any limitation on Congress’s ability to pick winners 
and losers in particular, pending cases is slim.18 
This Article reexamines Klein in order to determine what 
principle it states, if, indeed, it states any principle at all. A close 
look at Klein, its progeny, and related Supreme Court doctrine, 
reveals that Klein still polices the boundary between lawmaking 
and law application by preventing governmental self-dealing. That 
is, although Congress has broad leeway to direct the courts to write 
rules of decision for courts to follow, Congress does not have 
unlimited power to direct courts to render judgment in favor of the 
government in particular cases. A principle against governmental 
self-dealing not only explains Klein and other rule of decision 
cases, but it also situates Klein within a strong constitutional 
tradition that restrains the government from acting in its own 
self-interest without also providing generally applicable rules of 
conduct.19 
Part II of this Article describes Klein’s mysterious rule of 
decision principle and the meanings most often attributed it.20 
Klein has long stood for the proposition that Congress may not 
make an exception to federal court jurisdiction when the 
withdrawal “is founded solely on the application of a rule of 
decision, in causes pending, prescribed by Congress.”21 This 
statement seems, at first blush, correct because it resonates with 
abstract notions of separation of powers: a constitutional norm 
preventing Congress from prescribing a rule of decision in a 
particular case appears to insulate the judicial function from 
legislative interference. In his foundational essay about Congress’s 
power to limit the jurisdiction of the federal courts, Henry Hart 
                                                                                                     
against Iran). 
 17. See id. at 1329 (holding that the relevant statute does not offend 
separation of powers because it does not impinge upon the independence of the 
judiciary).  
 18. See id. at 1326 (upholding statute that directs judgment in favor of 
particular party in pending case). 
 19. See infra Part III (introducing a principle against governmental self-
dealing). 
 20. See infra Part II (discussing Klein). 
 21. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 146 (1871). 
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read Klein as establishing the principle that Article III of the 
Constitution creates a space for federal courts not just to declare 
one party to a case the winner, but actually, acting like a court, to 
decide the case.22 
Hart did not articulate what principle would constrain 
Congress’s otherwise broad power to set federal court jurisdiction; 
in the subsequent half-century, scholars have tried to answer this 
question by proposing principles that comport with the language 
and result of Klein itself and also explain the Court’s reluctance to 
find a Klein violation in any subsequent case.23 The most 
persuasive explanations of Klein’s rule of decision principle argue 
that the result turned on the specificity or retroactivity of the 
statute at issue in Klein,24 the fact that it seemed to be politically 
motivated,25 or the fact that it directed a decision in favor of the 
government.26 Despite the merits of these explanations, however, 
each fails to state an enforceable principle because each conflicts 
with longstanding doctrine and jurisprudential considerations. 
Recognizing the difficulty in finding a jurisprudentially coherent, 
doctrinally supported Klein principle, a number of scholars have 
given up looking for one, instead contending that, however 
important the sentiment animating Klein,27 the case states no 
enforceable and coherent principle about the line between the 
judiciary and the legislature.28  
                                                                                                     
 22. See Hart, supra note 6, at 1373 (inferring a limitation from Article III on 
Congress’s ability to “tell the court how to decide” a case over which it has 
jurisdiction). 
 23.  E.g., Sager, supra note 11, at 2528–29 (formulating principle based on 
Klein). 
 24. See GERANGELOS, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 11, at 177–79 (raising 
concerns about targeted legislation); Jackson, supra note 11, at 586–87 (same). 
 25. See Sager, supra note 11, at 2528–29 (describing a Klein principle that 
prohibits Congress from forcing the judiciary to “speak and act against its own 
best judgment”); Young, Klein, Then and Now, supra note 11, at 269 (arguing that 
Congress may not open the federal courts “only to use them as puppets”).  
 26. See GERANGELOS, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 11, at 181–83 (raising 
concern with legislation that favors the government as a party); Ronner, supra 
note 11, at 1071 (same); Young, Congressional Regulation, supra note 11, at 1244 
(same). 
 27. See Caminker, supra note 11, at 542 (arguing that Klein stands for 
important if unenforceable principles). 
 28. See Adrian Vermeule, The Judicial Power in the State (and Federal) 
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But, even this explanation is unsatisfying. Unlike many cases 
that the Court has explicitly or implicitly overruled, the Court 
continues to reaffirm the importance of Klein. In its recent Bank 
Markazi case, the Court reaffirmed Klein’s rule of decision 
language and appeared to try to make sense of Klein in light of 
prior and subsequent authority.29 Because the Court continues to 
treat Klein as stating an important constitutional principle, this 
Article seeks a viable principle that can explain Klein, square it 
with the significant doctrine that stands in tension with it, and 
situate it within the American constitutional tradition.30 
Part III returns to Klein to determine whether it is possible to 
articulate a rule of decision principle that meets the concerns 
raised in Part II.31 Closely analyzing the language of Klein reveals 
that the Court was troubled that Congress directed a result in 
favor of the government. But, as others have noted, a principle that 
prevents Congress from ever favoring the government in a pending 
case is too broad to accurately state the law.32 Nevertheless, Klein 
can be read, accurately and meaningfully, to embody a principle 
against governmental self-dealing. 
Governmental self-dealing is a phenomenon disfavored in 
constitutional law and jurisprudence. The generation that framed 
the Constitution, steeped in the republican tradition,33 developed 
                                                                                                     
Courts, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 357, 423–24 (2000) (arguing that “the Court has 
labored to identify some extra test, restriction, or factor that can coherently 
separate Klein violations from ordinary legislation” but “none of these efforts has 
succeeded”); Wasserman, supra note 11, at 85 (asserting that “Klein does no more 
than Marbury and dozens of cases in which the Court has struck down 
substantive federal statutory law as violating individual constitutional rights”). 
At least, Klein is still good law for its alternative holding about the line between 
congressional authority and the President’s pardon power. See Witkowski v. 
United States, 7 Ct. Cl. 393, 396–97 (1872) (reaffirming Klein’s application to the 
line between the executive and legislative branches).  
 29. See Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1323–26 (2016) 
(reaffirming the validity of the Klein rule of decision principle). 
 30. See infra Part III (introducing a Klein principle against governmental 
self-dealing). 
 31 Id. 
 32. See Redish & Pudelski, supra note 11, at 448 (reading Klein to permit 
Congress to enact “generally applicable rules of decision, even for pending cases 
in which the federal government is a party, which have the effect of deciding the 
case in the government’s favor”). 
 33. See NICHOLAS R. PARILLO, AGAINST THE PROFIT MOTIVE: THE SALARY 
THE KLEIN RULE OF DECISION PUZZLE 2141 
a strong aversion to self-dealing—that is—the act of trading on a 
public prerogative for private gain.34 Although members of the 
framing generation did not always act selflessly,35 a dominant 
strain of thought during the framing period held “official 
disinterestedness” in high regard.36 Prominent and ordinary 
members of this generation openly criticized public officials for 
benefitting from their official decisions37 and, very often, 
scrupulously avoided conflicts of interest when acting in a public 
capacity.38 Echoing a longstanding tradition, James Madison 
argued that “[n]o man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, 
because his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not 
improbably, corrupt his integrity.”39 From this premise, Madison 
                                                                                                     
REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, 1780–1940, at 10 (2013) (describing the 
“civic republican” tradition); ZEPHYR TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN AMERICA: FROM 
BENJAMIN FRANKLIN’S SNUFF BOX TO CITIZENS UNITED 39 (2014) [hereinafter 
TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN AMERICA] (connecting republicanism with a principle 
against public corruption); Jack M. Balkin, Which Republican Constitution?, 32 
CONST. COMMENT. 31, 49–50 (2017) (describing the American tradition of 
republicanism); Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L. 
REV. 341, 373–74 (2009) [hereinafter Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle] 
(arguing that the Constitution’s framers shared a general belief that political 
corruption includes the “self-serving use of public power for private ends”). 
 34. See KEN KERNAGHAN & JOHN LANGFORD, THE RESPONSIBLE PUBLIC 
SERVANT 142–43 (1990) (describing the use of public authority for private gain). 
 35. See KENNETH R. BOWLING, THE CREATION OF WASHINGTON, D.C.: THE IDEA 
AND LOCATION OF THE AMERICAN CAPITAL 214 (1991) (noting President George 
Washington’s possible self-interest in selecting D.C.’s location); PARILLO, supra 
note 33, at 29, 42 (describing colonial and post-revolutionary American legal 
structures that permitted self-interested official behavior); Seth Barrett Tillman, 
Business Transactions and President Trump’s Emoluments Problem, 40 HARV. 
J.L. PUB. POL’Y 759, 764–66 (2017) (explaining President George Washington’s 
“engage[ment] in business transactions for value with the Federal Government”).  
 36. PARILLO, supra note 33, at 10. 
 37. See BOWLING, supra note 35, at 213 (noting criticism of Washington for 
self-interested behavior); Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, supra note 33, 
at 373 (discussing distinction between self-interest and public interest). 
 38. See JEAN EDWARD SMITH, JOHN MARSHALL, DEFINER OF A NATION 429 
(1996) (describing John Marshall’s avoidance of appearance of conflicts of 
interest); GORDON WOOD, REVOLUTIONARY CHARACTERS: WHAT MADE THE 
FOUNDERS DIFFERENT 16–20 (2006) [hereinafter WOOD, REVOLUTIONARY 
CHARACTERS] (describing disinterestedness in 18th Century America). 
 39. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 124 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 
1987). 
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reasoned that the proposed Constitution’s system of representative 
government can mitigate the effects of self-interested 
decision-making.40 A principle against self-dealing, not 
surprisingly, is reflected in a number of the Constitution’s clauses. 
For example, the Constitution precludes the Vice President from 
presiding over Senate proceedings to convict the President after 
impeachment because the Vice President would benefit personally 
and directly from official decisions that led to the President’s 
conviction and removal.41 
Examining Supreme Court doctrine other than Klein confirms 
that minimizing governmental self-dealing is a central concern of 
constitutional law. A close reading of well-established doctrine 
under the Due Process,42 Contract,43 and Ex Post Facto44 Clauses 
demonstrates that a principle against governmental self-dealing 
animates the Court’s interpretation of these clauses, all of which 
help define the relationship between the government and the 
individual. As a result, reading Klein to state a principle against 
self-dealing situates the rule of decision principle within a broader 
tradition that prevents the government from aggrandizing its 
authority through self-interested behavior at the expense of 
individual citizens. 
Principles gleaned from the Court’s self-dealing doctrine can 
be arranged into an administrable test that not only largely 
                                                                                                     
 40. See id at 124–25. 
 41. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (providing that when “the President of 
the United States is tried [by the Senate], the Chief Justice shall preside”); Akhil 
Reed Amar & Vikram David Amar, Is the Presidential Succession Law 
Constitutional?, 48 STAN. L. REV. 113, 121–22 (1995) (reading the Constitution’s 
clause requiring the Chief Justice to preside over Senate trials of the President 
as a device to curb self-dealing); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XXVII (delaying 
congressional pay raises until after an intervening election). 
 42. See United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 896 (1996) 
(distinguishing between “regulatory legislation that is relatively free of 
Government self-interest . . . and, on the other hand, statutes tainted by a 
governmental object of self-relief”). 
 43. See U.S. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 25–26 (1977) (holding 
that “complete deference to a legislative assessment of reasonableness and 
necessity is not appropriate because the State’s self-interest is at stake”). 
 44. See Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 532–33 (2000) (holding that the Ex 
Post Facto Clause prevents the government from retroactively altering rules “in 
a way that is advantageous only to the State”). 
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explains existing rule of decision doctrine but also provides 
direction to courts resolving future cases. Stated succinctly, a Klein 
principle against governmental self-dealing prevents a court from 
applying a change in law that has the effect of benefitting the 
government as a party in a case that is pending.45 A statute 
benefits the government as a party if it has the effect of abrogating 
an obligation owed by the government46 in a way that is not merely 
incidental to the accomplishment of a broader governmental 
objective.47  
Part IV applies the test formulated above to Klein and the 
other rule of decision cases, demonstrating the ability of the Klein 
self-dealing principle to explain current doctrine.48 Part V unpacks 
the most important implications of the new rule by applying it to a 
series of hypothetical cases.49 By analyzing these hypothetical 
cases, the advantages of a Klein principle against self-dealing are 
revealed: it better explains the law than other theoretical models; 
it situates Klein within a robust constitutional tradition 
disfavoring governmental self-dealing; it provides clear guidance 
to lower courts facing rule of decision cases; and it explains why 
the Court has continued to reaffirm Klein’s importance despite its 
inability to articulate a workable principle.  
II. The Elusive Klein Rule of Decision Principle 
The search for an enforceable Klein rule of decision principle 
can feel quixotic. Like Don Quixote, the seeker of this principle 
must be idealistic enough to look for coherence among Supreme 
Court cases whose results are more easily explained by politics 
                                                                                                     
 45. See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 146 (1871) (declining 
to apply change in law to favor the government); Winstar, 518 U.S. at 896–98 
(same); United States Trust, 431 U.S. at 25–26 (same); Perry v. United States, 
294 U.S. 330, 347 (1935) (same). 
 46. See United States Trust, 431 U.S. at 25–26 (declining to defer to state’s 
repudiation of its own financial obligation). 
 47. See Winstar, 518 U.S. at 896–98 (distinguishing between self-interested 
laws and statutes “incidental to the accomplishment of a broader governmental 
objective”). 
 48. See infra Part IV (describing a Klein self-dealing principle). 
 49. See infra Part V (applying Klein to hypothetical cases). 
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than law. The prize is the ability to articulate an enforceable 
principle that elegantly separates Congress’s power to write rules 
of decision from the federal courts’ power to decide cases pending 
before them. But just as Quixote tilted at windmills, the federal 
courts knight-errant is faced with explanations for Klein that 
appear formidable until they are subjected to close examination. 
This Part describes the Klein case and its elusive rule of decision 
principle. It then explores each of the meanings most often 
attributed to Klein and demonstrates the limitations of each as an 
enforceable constitutional principle. 
A. The Klein Case 
The enigmatic Klein rule of decision principle grew out of an 
interpretation of the 1863 Abandoned and Captured Property Act 
(ACPA), which permitted federal agents to seize and sell 
abandoned or captured civilian property in states or territories in 
rebellion against the United States.50 Because some of the property 
would belong to loyal residents of rebellious areas, the ACPA 
permitted claimants to make claims against the United States for 
the value of seized property, provided that they demonstrated that 
they had “never given any aid or comfort to the present rebellion.”51 
Despite the more obvious interpretation of this language, the 
Supreme Court held in a case called United States v. Padelford52 
that even a person who had committed disloyal acts would be 
considered to have “never given any aid or comfort to the present 
rebellion” as long as he later took an oath of loyalty pursuant to a 
presidential pardon.53 In facts similar to those in Padelford, 
Wilson, a wealthy merchant, took an oath of loyalty after his cotton 
was confiscated and sold by Union forces.54 After Wilson’s death, 
Klein, the administrator of his estate, prevailed in a suit under the 
                                                                                                     
 50. Abandoned and Captured Property Act of 1863, ch. 120, § 1, 12 Stat. 820. 
 51. Id. § 3. 
 52. 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 531 (1869). 
 53. Id. at 534 (emphasis added). 
 54. See Amanda L. Tyler, The Story of Klein: The Scope of Congress’s 
Authority to Shape the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, in FEDERAL COURTS 
STORIES 87, 91–92, 103 (Vicki C. Jackson & Judith Resnik eds., 2010) (discussing 
the historical background of Padelford). 
THE KLEIN RULE OF DECISION PUZZLE 2145 
ACPA before the Court of Claims.55 The idea of formerly rebellious 
southerners taking advantage of a loyalty oath to recover money 
from the Treasury exercised the Radical Republicans in 
Congress,56 many of whom did not share Lincoln’s hope that 
post-war politics would proceed “with malice toward none” and 
“charity toward all.”57 While Klein’s case was pending on the 
government’s appeal from the award, Congress tried to undo 
Padelford by eliminating pending and future claims under the 
ACPA for claimants who relied on an oath of loyalty.58 
In what would otherwise have been a routine appropriations 
bill funding the federal government for the coming year, Congress 
added a proviso that would become the focal point of the Supreme 
Court’s Klein decision.59 After appropriating money to pay 
judgments rendered against the United States, the bill provided 
that no loyalty oath would be admissible as evidence to support any 
claim against the United States under the ACPA,60 as it had been 
used in Padelford and Klein’s action before the Court of Claims.61  
Instead, a presidential pardon would serve as “conclusive evidence 
that [a claimant] did take part in and give aid and comfort to the 
late rebellion” within the meaning of the ACPA.62 The proviso 
further directed the Court of Claims to dismiss suits in which the 
claimant asserted an oath of loyalty as proof of claim and withdrew 
jurisdiction from the Supreme Court over claims—like Klein’s—in 
which the claimant had previously prevailed based on a loyalty 
oath.63 
                                                                                                     
 55. Id. at 93. 
 56. Id. at 94–95 (arguing that the proviso was prompted by the Radical 
Republican desire to undo Padelford). 
 57. Abraham Lincoln, Second Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1865). 
 58. See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 143–44 (1871) (noting 
that the proviso made “no pardon . . . admissible in evidence” to support a claim 
for reparations). 
 59. Tyler, supra note 54, at 94–95. The appropriations proviso is also known 
as the Drake Amendment, after its sponsor, United States Senator from Missouri, 
Charles Drake. Id. 
 60. Act of July 12, 1870, ch. 251, § 1, 16 Stat. 230, 235. 
 61. United States v. Padelford, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 531, 533 (1869); Klein, 
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 133–34.  
 62. Act of July 12, 1870 § 1. 
 63. Id.  
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B. Klein’s Promises 
When the government’s appeal from the Court of Claims’s 
judgment for Klein reached the Supreme Court, the Court 
invalidated the appropriations proviso and held that Klein was 
entitled to his judgment.64 This much is clear. But, what is less 
clear is the basis for the result. Neither in Klein itself, nor in 
subsequent cases, has the Court adequately explained precisely 
what principle animates the holding.65 In his opinion for the Court, 
Chief Justice Chase introduced a number of interrelated concepts 
that have formed the basis for all subsequent discussions about 
Klein’s meaning.66 In order to understand Klein’s possible 
meanings, it is first helpful to examine Chase’s language. 
Chase began by finding that Wilson (Klein’s decedent) had 
been pardoned pursuant to presidential proclamation and 
statutory acts of amnesty.67 As a result, under the pre-proviso 
ACPA, as interpreted in Padelford, Klein would be entitled to the 
proceeds of the seized cotton.68 The issue, then, was the effect of 
the appropriations proviso.69 Because the proviso purported to 
withdraw the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims and the Supreme 
Court, Chase addressed whether Congress has power to do so 
under its authority to manage the inferior courts of the United 
States and its power to make exceptions from the Supreme Court’s 
appellate jurisdiction.70 Chase acknowledged that “the legislature 
has complete control over the organization and existence” of the 
Court of Claims and the absolute right to eliminate the Supreme 
Court’s appellate jurisdiction over “a particular class of cases.”71 
But, Chase noted, “the proviso shows plainly that it does not intend 
                                                                                                     
 64. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 148. 
 65. See Tyler, supra note 54, at 87; Redish & Pudelski, supra note 11, at 437; 
Vermeule, supra note 28, at 423–24; Vladeck, supra note 11, at 251; Wasserman, 
supra note 11, at 54–55. 
 66. See, e.g., Tyler, supra note 54, at 101–13; Redish & Pudelski, supra note 
11, at 437; Vermeule, supra note 28, at 423–24; Vladeck, supra note 11, at 251; 
Wasserman, supra note 11, at 54–55. 
 67. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 140–43 (1871).  
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 142. 
 70. Id. at 143. 
 71. Id. at 145. 
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to withhold appellate jurisdiction except as a means to an end,” 
that is, to deny the effect of presidential pardons.72 Because the 
purpose of the proviso was to “deny to pardons granted by the 
President the effect which this court had adjudged them to have,” 
Chase concluded that the proviso’s withdrawal of jurisdiction was 
“founded solely on the application of a rule of decision, in causes 
pending, prescribed by Congress.”73 
It is these words, Klein’s rule of decision principle, which have 
intrigued and confounded generations of scholars. 
The cause of this confusion is clear: where one would expect 
an explanation of what is wrong with a statute that withdraws 
jurisdiction based on a “rule of decision, in causes pending, 
prescribed by Congress,”74 Chase offered scarcely more than a 
repetition of the rule of decision language. Chase wrote that the 
proviso was not an exercise of Congress’s Exceptions Clause power 
because it required the Court to “ascertain the existence of certain 
facts and thereupon to declare that its jurisdiction on appeal has 
ceased . . . . What is this but to prescribe a rule for the decision of 
a cause in a particular way?”75 Chase then made the same point a 
third time: “We are directed to dismiss the appeal, if we find that 
the judgment must be affirmed, because of a pardon . . . . Can we 
do so without allowing that the legislature may prescribe rules of 
decision to the Judicial Department of the government in cases 
pending before it? We think not . . . .”76 Chase concluded that this 
behavior—prescribing a rule of decision in causes pending—
“passed the limit which separates the legislative from the judicial 
power.”77 
Chase made two other points that are relevant for determining 
the scope of Klein. First, Chase intimated that the proviso was 
defective because it intervened in a suit in favor of the United 
States against a private party.78 Specifically, Chase was bothered 
by the fact that the proviso purported to allow “one party to the 
                                                                                                     
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 145–46. 
 74. Id. at 146.  
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 147. 
 78. Id. at 146.  
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controversy to decide it in its own favor.”79 And, later, Chase 
returned to this theme, denouncing the proviso because it 
withdrew the Court’s jurisdiction “because and only because its 
decision, in accordance with settled law, must be adverse to the 
government and favorable to the suitor.”80 Second, Chase held, in 
the alternative, that the statute violated the principle of 
separation of powers because it purported to change the effect of 
the President’s amnesty proclamation.81 The legislature “cannot 
change the effect of such a pardon any more than the executive can 
change a law.”82 The proviso, then, impaired not only the judicial 
power by prescribing a rule of decision in causes pending; it also 
“impair[ed] the executive authority and direct[ed] the court to be 
instrumental to that end.”83 
Chase’s short opinion ended with a statement that, with 
hindsight, seems imbued with irony: “We think it unnecessary to 
enlarge. The simplest statement is the best.”84 But, Chase’s opinion 
has proved far from simple to disentangle. It has generated reams 
of scholarship attempting to discern what Klein meant in its own 
time and what it might mean today.85 Many of these readings 
contain useful insights but none have proved wholly satisfying. 
The following section analyzes each of the most likely readings of 
Klein and determines whether any can serve as the basis for an 
independent, enforceable rule of decision principle. 
C. Klein’s Broken Promises 
Klein’s rule of decision principle, that it is unconstitutional for 
Congress to withdraw jurisdiction from the federal courts based 
“solely on the application of a rule of decision, in causes pending, 
                                                                                                     
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 147. 
 81. Id.  
 82. Id. at 148.  
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. See generally Daniel J. Meltzer, Congress, Courts, and Constitutional 
Remedies, 86 GEO. L. J. 2547, 2549 (1998) [hereinafter Meltzer, Constitutional 
Remedies]; Redish & Pudelski, supra note 11, at 437; Wasserman, supra note 11, 
at 65.  
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prescribed by Congress,”86 seems at once intuitively correct and too 
broad to be literally true.87 The rule of decision language resonates 
with abstract notions of separation of powers; preventing Congress 
from prescribing a rule of decision in a particular case appears to 
preserve an important part of the judicial function from legislative 
interference. However, a literal reading of this prohibition conflicts 
with precedent requiring courts to apply the law as Congress 
writes it, even on appeal from final judgment in pending cases, and 
even retroactively.88  Scholars and courts have tried to resolve this 
tension by offering a variety of interpretations of Klein’s rule of 
decision principle.89 Some of these readings attempt to articulate a 
Klein rule of decision principle that is viable in light of previous 
and subsequent precedent.90 Other readings conclude that Klein 
serves as a reminder of important, if unenforceable constitutional 
values.91 Still other readings of Klein conclude that its rule of 
decision language is meaningless and should be ignored.92 The rest 
of this Part considers the most likely explanations of Klein’s rule 
of decision language, including the possibility that Klein states no 
principle about the line separating the legislative and judicial 
functions that can be enforced consistent with doctrine.93 
                                                                                                     
 86. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 145–46 (1871). 
 87. See Meltzer, Constitutional Remedies, supra note 85, at 2549 (arguing 
that Klein’s principle resonates as important but lacks doctrinal force); Redish & 
Pudelski, supra note 11, at 446 (same); Wasserman, supra note 11, at 65 (same). 
 88. See United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 110 (1801) 
(holding that when “subsequent to the judgment and before the decision of the 
appellate court, a law intervenes and positively changes the rule which governs, 
the [new] law must be obeyed”). 
 89. See supra note 11 (collecting sources describing Klein).  
 90. See, e.g., Young, Congressional Regulation, supra note 11, at 1244 
(arguing that Klein represents an extension of a principle against nonjudicial 
revision of court judgments). 
 91. See, e.g., Caminker, supra note 11, at 542 (arguing that Klein stands for 
important if unenforceable principles).  
 92. See, e.g., Vermeule, supra note 28, at 380–81 (arguing that Klein states 
no coherent and enforceable principle about the line between the judiciary and 
the legislature). 
 93. See infra Part II.C. 
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1. May Congress Prescribe a Rule of Decision? 
The Klein Court objected to the fact that Congress prescribed 
a rule of decision to the courts in causes pending before them.94 The 
relevance of the fact that the appropriations proviso affected 
pending cases is addressed below.95 But, putting aside the 
important issue of specificity for a moment, the Court’s concern in 
Klein cannot be that Congress prescribed a rule of decision for the 
courts to follow. As a number of scholars have recognized, writing 
rules of decision for courts to follow—that is, writing the 
substantive law—is precisely what a legislature does.96  
Even the more limited claim, that a legislature may not 
prescribe how a court finds facts to apply to a rule of decision, 
proves too much.97 Congress can, and does, write rules of evidence, 
defining what is relevant, what is admissible and inadmissible, 
and who is competent to give testimony.98 A notable exception 
proves the rule: the Constitution specifically provides a definition 
of treason, sets out its required elements, and establishes the mode 
of proof required to establish its elements.99 In the absence of the 
rare constitutional restriction on its power, Congress is free to 
create a claim, delineate its elements, and establish how it may be 
proved; in short, Congress may prescribe rules of decision for 
courts to follow. As a result, Klein cannot stand for the unadorned 
proposition that Congress may not prescribe a rule of decision to a 
federal court. 
                                                                                                     
 94. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 146 (1871) (invalidating 
the proviso for prescribing a rule of decision in causes pending). 
 95. See infra Part II.C.2. 
 96. See PFANDER, supra note 5, at 405 (noting that applying rules of decision 
is precisely what courts do); Tyler, supra note 54, at 105 (same); Wasserman, 
supra note 11, at 65 (same). 
 97. Vermeule, supra note 28, at 380–81 (arguing that all statutes make some 
facts relevant or irrelevant to adjudication). 
 98. See generally FED. R. EVID. State legislatures, too, write substantive, 
evidentiary, and procedural rules. See generally VA. R. EVID.; VA CODE. ANN. 
§ 8.01 (West 2011). 
 99. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3 (“Treason against the United States, shall 
consist only in levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving 
them Aid and Comfort . . . . No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the 
Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open 
Court.”). 
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2. May Congress Prescribe a Rule of Decision for 
Particular Cases? 
Of course, the Klein Court did not invalidate the proviso 
simply because it prescribed a rule of decision. Instead, Klein held 
that Congress may not “prescribe rules of decision to the Judicial 
Department of the government in cases pending before it.”100 This 
language suggests that the Court disapproved of the proviso’s 
application only to a particular set of cases that were identifiable 
because they were already pending before the courts. The Court 
made its concern about the particularity of the appropriations 
proviso explicit when it described Congress’s more general power 
under the Exceptions Clause.101 Congress’s broad power to 
withdraw jurisdiction from the Court may lawfully be exercised 
only on “a particular class of cases.”102 By contrast, the proviso 
applied to particular cases, identifiable because they were pending 
before the federal courts, rather than a class of cases. 
It is the application of a rule of decision to pending cases 
rather than a class of cases that Court describes as “arbitrary” and 
explains the distinction Chase drew between Klein’s facts and 
those of its earlier case, State of Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & 
Belmont Bridge Co.103 The Court had previously enjoined the 
operation of a bridge that interfered with shipping after finding 
that it was a nuisance.104 Congress then enacted a statute 
declaring that the bridge was not a nuisance.105 In Wheeling 
                                                                                                     
 100. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 146 (emphasis added). 
 101. See id. at 147 (“The Constitution . . . provides that in all cases other than 
those of original jurisdiction, ‘the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction 
both as to law and fact, with such exceptions and under such regulations as the 
Congress shall make.’” (quoting U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2)). 
 102. Id. at 145 (emphasis added). 
 103. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421 (1855); see Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 146–47 
(distinguishing the proviso from the statute at issue in Wheeling Bridge). The 
Court made this point explicitly in United States v. Sioux Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 
430 (1980) (“While Congress enjoys broad authority to regulate judicial 
proceedings in the context of a class of cases, when Congress regulates functions 
of the judiciary in a pending case, it walks the line between judicial and legislative 
authority.” (internal citation omitted)). 
 104. See Wheeling Bridge, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 440 (describing the history 
leading up to the statute declaring the bridge lawful). 
 105. Id. at 422.  
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Bridge, the Court held that courts must apply new law enacted 
during an ongoing litigation that changes the legal significance of 
a fact relevant to the litigation.106 Because the injunction was 
dependent on the finding that the bridge was a nuisance, 
Congress’s declaration that the bridge was not a nuisance changed 
the legal significance of the bridge’s interference with shipping and 
justified the dissolution of the injunction.107 In Klein, Chase 
distinguished this case in the following way: the Wheeling Bridge 
Court dissolved the injunction based on the generally applicable 
law of nuisance; that is, once the bridge was no longer a nuisance, 
the injunction was no longer justified.108 This was lawful, Chase 
explained, because the Court “was left to apply its ordinary rules 
to the new circumstances created” by the new statute.109 As a 
result, no “arbitrary rule of decision was prescribed in that case.”110 
By contrast, wrote Chase, the Klein appropriations proviso did not 
create “new circumstances” but rather required the Court to make 
an exception from the standing laws for particular “cases pending 
before it.”111 In other words, the appropriations proviso was 
arbitrary because it made an exception from the generally 
applicable law—the recovery provision of the ACPA—for an 
identifiable set of cases, and no others. 
The Court’s uneasiness about legislative particularity 
comports with basic rule of law principles; if Congress may 
prescribe a new rule for a case that is currently before the courts—
and only for that case—it can subject one known individual to 
treatment that is different than the treatment of others for 
identical conduct. As I have argued elsewhere, a rule that prohibits 
legislation from targeting identifiable individuals—a value of 
legislative generality—is a principle of constitutional dimension.112 
                                                                                                     
 106. Id. at 431.  
 107. Id. at 431–32. 
 108. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 146–47 (1871).  
 109. Id. at 147.  
 110. Id. at 146.  
 111. Id. at 146–47. 
 112. See generally Evan C. Zoldan, Reviving Legislative Generality, 98 MARQ. 
L. REV. 625 (2014) [hereinafter Zoldan, Reviving Legislative Generality]; Evan C. 
Zoldan, The Equal Protection Component of Legislative Generality, 51 RICH. L. 
REV. 489 (2017) [hereinafter Zoldan, The Equal Protection Component]. 
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This value comports with constitutional history, the Constitution’s 
text, and widely held jurisprudential commitments.113 Indeed, a 
value of legislative generality seems to follow directly from Chief 
Justice Marshall’s statement in Fletcher v. Peck,114 that “[i]t is the 
peculiar province of the legislature to prescribe general rules for 
the government of society; the application of those rules to 
individuals in society would seem to be the duty of other 
departments.”115 The Court was even more explicit in Hurtado v. 
California,116 in which it explained that “a special rule for a 
particular person or a particular case” cannot properly be 
considered “law.”117 In that case, the Court opined that all types of 
targeted legislation are invalid, including: “acts of confiscation, 
acts reversing judgments, and acts directly transferring one man’s 
estate to another.”118 Because of the injustice of particularized 
legislation, and because of Klein’s focus on pending cases, the most 
persuasive explanations of Klein focus on the connection between 
legislative direction of the result in pending cases and a value that 
disfavors legislative particularity.119 For example, Vicki Jackson 
argued that Klein might prohibit Congress from telling a court how 
to decide a particular case, even if that prohibition can be evaded 
by artful drafting.120 Peter Gerangelos formulated a Klein principle 
that accords legislative specificity important, but nonconclusive, 
weight.121 
                                                                                                     
 113. Zoldan, Reviving Legislative Generality, supra note 112, at 650–60 
(describing the constitutional tradition suggesting an enforceable value of 
legislative generality).  
 114. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch.) 87 (1810). 
 115. Id. at 136 (emphasis added). 
 116. 110 U.S. 516 (1884). 
 117. Id. at 535–36. 
 118. Id. at 536. 
 119. See generally Araiza, supra note 7, at 1104–05; Peter A. Gerangelos, The 
Separation of Powers and Legislative Interference in Pending Cases, 30 SYDNEY L. 
REV. 61, 82 (2008) [hereinafter Gerangelos, Pending Cases]; Jackson, supra note 
11, at 583–84. For an argument that legislative generality was already defunct 
after Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc’y, 503 U.S. 429 (1992), see Wasserman, 
supra note 11, at 67–69. 
 120. See Jackson, supra note 11, at 586–87 (noting that the legislature can 
control judicial interpretations through narrow drafting).  
 121. See GERANGELOS, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 11, at 177–79 
(formulating principles to govern legislative direction of judgments). 
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The modern Supreme Court has been less receptive to the idea 
of a value of legislative generality. The Court’s recent Bank 
Markazi decision, in particular, seriously calls into question 
whether legislation is ever constitutionally suspect simply because 
it is particularized.122 Bank Markazi grew out of Congress’s 
expansion of an exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 
(FSIA) that allows for suits against state sponsors of terrorism.123 
Victims of terrorism, and family members and estate 
representatives of those victims, demonstrated that the country of 
Iran was responsible for injuries and deaths caused by terrorist 
acts.124 Judgments in their favor, which amounted to billions of 
dollars, could not be satisfied by assets in the United States.125 
With their judgments unsatisfied, these claimants filed a 
consolidated action against Bank Markazi, the Central Bank of 
Iran.126 Under generally applicable law, however, Bank Markazi, 
as a Central Bank, was specifically excluded from the definition of 
“state sponsor of terrorism” in the FSIA127 and so could not be 
reached to satisfy the existing default judgments against Iran.128 
To avoid this result, Congress enacted the Iran Threat Reduction 
and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, which permitted claims 
against Iran under the FSIA to be satisfied by the assets of Bank 
Markazi.129 Specifically, Congress provided that the “financial 
assets that are identified in . . . Peterson et al. v. Islamic Republic 
of Iran et al., Case No. 10 Civ. 4518” would be available “to satisfy 
                                                                                                     
 122. See Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1327 (2012) (“While 
legislatures usually act through laws of general applicability, that is by no means 
their only legitimate mode of action.” (quoting Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 
514 U.S. 211, 239 n.9 (1995))). 
 123. See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1605A (2012) 
(providing terrorism exception to sovereign immunity of foreign states); Bank 
Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1319–20 (explaining the operation of the FSIA).  
 124. Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1315.  
 125. Id. at 1319–20, 1319 n.5, 1320 n.6. 
 126. Id. at 1315.  
 127. 28 U.S.C. § 1611(b)(1). 
 128. Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1318. 
 129. Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, 22 U.S.C. 
§ 8772 (creating an exception from the general operation of the FSIA); 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1611(b)(1) (2012) (providing that funds belonging to a state’s central bank are 
immune from attachment).  
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any judgment . . . awarded against Iran for damages for personal 
injury or death caused by” acts of terrorism.130 The Iran Threat 
Reduction statute applied to the particular, pending case against 
Bank Markazi and no others. 
Before the Supreme Court, Bank Markazi argued that the 
Iran Threat Reduction statute violated Klein’s rule of decision 
principle because it prescribed a rule that applied to a single 
pending case, indeed, one identified in the statute itself.131 The 
Court rejected the Bank’s position that there is something wrong 
with particularized legislative action.132 The Court noted that “the 
assumption that legislation must be generally applicable,” is 
“flawed.”133 The Court continued: although “legislatures usually 
act through laws of general applicability, that is by no means their 
only legitimate mode of action.”134 Citing examples of 
particularized laws that have been held constitutional (but silent 
on Fletcher, Hurtado, and related doctrine), the Court held that 
“singling out” an individual is not enough to render a statute 
invalid.135 
Bank Markazi’s affirmative rejection of a principle disfavoring 
particularized legislative action was an innovation. Although the 
modern Court has not rigorously enforced a value of legislative 
generality,136 previous decisions reserved judgment on whether 
targeted legislation could ever be constitutionally defective in the 
context of Klein’s rule of decision principle.137 In Robertson v. 
Seattle Audubon Society,138 the Court reserved for another day the 
possibility that a change in law would be considered 
“unconstitutional if the change swept no more broadly, or little 
more broadly, than the range of applications at issue” in 
                                                                                                     
 130. 22 U.S.C. § 8772(a)(1), (b) (emphasis added). 
 131. Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1323 (2012). 
 132. Id. at 1327. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. See Nixon v. Admin. of Gen. Serv., 433 U.S. 425, 472 (1977) (holding that 
Congress may legislate for one person if that person is a legitimate class of one). 
 137. See infra notes 138–144 and accompanying text (considering, but not 
deciding, whether particularized legislation can ever be constitutionally infirm). 
 138. 503 U.S. 429 (1992). 
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specifically named cases.139 When another day came, in Plaut v. 
Spendthrift Farm Inc.,140 the Court again avoided deciding the 
issue of specificity.141 In Plaut, the Court invalidated legislation 
reopening final judgments; but, the Court did not rest on the fact 
that the statute reopened specific cases, instead noting only in 
passing that it was “questionable” whether there was something 
wrong with particularized legislative action.142 By contrast, Bank 
Markazi’s rejection of a value that disfavors particularized 
legislation appears more or less definitive.143 The Court’s rejection 
of a principle of legislative generality is a misstep that it may need 
to retract on further reflection: it does not give appropriate weight 
to a constitutional principle of legislative generality suggested by 
the Constitution’s text, history, and philosophical 
underpinnings.144 Nevertheless, whatever were the reasons 
underlying Klein at the time, if Klein stands for an enforceable 
principle today, it must be narrower than a prohibition on all 
particularized legislation. 
3. May Congress Prescribe a Rule of Decision Retroactively? 
Closely related to the issue of specificity is the issue of 
retroactivity. By providing a rule of decision for cases already 
pending at the time of its enactment, Klein’s appropriations 
proviso required retroactive application of its new evidentiary 
standard.145 Retroactively applied legislation has long been 
                                                                                                     
 139. Id. at 441. 
 140. 514 U.S. 211 (1995). 
 141. See id. (deciding case on grounds other than specificity of statute). 
 142. Id. at 239. Moreover, Plaut invalidated rather than upheld the statute at 
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5, at 404, 405 (noting “an element of retroactivity” in the proviso). 
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criticized because it can be used to subject a person to conduct he 
could not have known was wrong, thereby denying him the 
opportunity to conform his conduct to the law.146 Consider Wilson, 
Klein’s decedent: he could not have known that taking an oath of 
loyalty would, in the future, preclude a suit for damages before the 
Court of Claims for his confiscated cotton. Had Wilson known 
about this future statute, he might well have chosen to forego the 
oath with an eye toward attempting to prove his claim some other 
way. Because retrospective laws fail to provide notice of what 
conduct is considered lawful, they have been called “oppressive, 
unjust, and tyrannical” and “condemned by the universal sentence 
of civilized man.”147 
However good are the jurisprudential reasons for prohibiting 
the retrospective application of statutes, the Supreme Court has 
long permitted retroactive laws like Klein’s appropriations 
proviso.148 Generally, courts apply a change in law to cases pending 
at the time of the change.149 This has long been true, despite the 
fact that a person affected by a new law applied in a pending case 
has no opportunity to conform her conduct to the law before it is 
applied.150 Even outside the context of pending cases, moreover, 
restrictions on retroactivity are narrow. The Constitution’s 
prohibition on ex post facto laws applies only to criminal or penal 
laws.151 By contrast, courts will apply civil, nonpunitive laws 
                                                                                                     
 146. See Charles B. Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality 
of Retroactive Legislation, 73 HARV. L. REV. 692, 693, 715, 723 (1960) (arguing 
that retroactive legislation denies a person the ability to conform conduct to the 
requirements of the law); Evan C. Zoldan, The Civil Ex Post Facto Clause, 2015 
WISC. L. REV. 727, 729 (2015) (same). 
 147. Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 216, 266 (1827); see also 
LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 53 (1969) (“Taken by itself, . . . a retroactive 
law is truly a monstrosity.”).  
 148. See, e.g., United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 110 
(1801). 
 149. See id. (holding that when “subsequent to the judgment and before the 
decision of the appellate court, a law intervenes and positively changes the rule 
which governs, the [new] law must be obeyed”). 
 150. See John Bernard Corr, Retroactivity: A Study in Supreme Court 
Doctrine “As Applied,” 61 N.C. L. REV. 745, 752–53, 756–58, 773 (1983) (discussing 
the retroactive effect of applying laws to pending cases). 
 151. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 9–10; Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 389 (1798) 
(opining that Ex Post Facto Clause applies only to criminal laws); see also John 
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retroactively, so long as Congress clearly stated its intention to act 
retroactively.152 Although distasteful, a civil statute like Klein’s 
appropriations proviso would not have been prohibited because of 
its retroactivity either at the time Klein was decided or today. As 
a result, an enforceable Klein principle cannot be based on an 
aversion to retroactivity.  
4. May Congress Prescribe a Rule of Decision Based on 
Political Motives?  
For all its opacity, the Klein opinion clearly acknowledges the 
strongest counterargument to its result: Congress directed the 
dismissal of suits like Klein’s by altering federal court jurisdiction 
and the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction, over which it noted 
that “the legislature has complete control.”153 What made the 
appropriations proviso invalid—an exception to, or limitation on, 
Congress’s broad authority—was the fact that it did “not intend to 
withhold appellate jurisdiction except as a means to an end.”154 It 
seems, then, that the Court objected to Congress’s motive behind 
its withdrawal of jurisdiction. Put otherwise, the Court suggested 
that some motivations for withdrawing jurisdiction are invalid and 
would not be enforced. An internal limitation on Congress’s power 
over federal court jurisdiction, as suggested by Klein,155 does 
comport with the Constitution’s language.156 As Leonard Ratner 
argued, in order for an exception from jurisdiction to remain an 
                                                                                                     
Harrison, Legislative Power and Judicial Power, 31 CONST. COMMENT. 295, 302–
03 (2016) (same). 
 152. See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 266 (1994) (declining to 
give retroactive effect to statute absent a clear statement by Congress). 
 153. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 146 (1871). 
 154. Id. at 145 (emphasis added). 
 155. Id. at 147 (holding that Congress’s power to make exceptions to the 
appellate jurisdiction of the federal courts does not apply when the limitation is 
only a means to an end).  
 156. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (providing that the “Supreme Court shall 
have appellate jurisdiction . . . with such exceptions, and under such regulations 
as the Congress shall make”).  
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“exception,” it must not be so broad as to swallow the general grant 
of jurisdiction.157  
If Congress’s motive was objectionable, it was because, as the 
Klein Court stated plainly, Congress’s goal was to deny the effect 
of the president’s pardon power.158 Generalizing from the Court’s 
statement, commentators have suggested that, even outside the 
specific context of jurisdiction and the pardon power, 159 the proviso 
was objectionable because it directed the Court to do something 
otherwise unconstitutional. In Daniel Meltzer’s phrase, Congress 
may not compel the courts “to speak a constitutional untruth.”160 
                                                                                                     
 157. Leonard Ratner, Congressional Power Over the Appellate Jurisdiction of 
the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 157, 169 (1960) (arguing that an exception 
presumes the existence of a general rule); see also Jed Handelsman Shugerman, 
A Six-Three Rule: Reviving Consensus and Deference on the Supreme Court, 37 
GA. L. REV. 893, 973 (2003) (same). 
 158. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 145–46. 
 159. Even reading Klein as a limitation only on Congress’s power to withdraw 
jurisdiction for political reasons is likely too broad to be accurate. In Ex Parte 
McCardle, just a few years before Klein, and also authored by Chief Justice Chase, 
the Court upheld a jurisdiction-stripping act that threatened to interfere with the 
Radical Republican political agenda. 74 U.S. 506, 514 (1868); see also Daniel 
Meltzer, The Story of Ex Parte McCardle, in FEDERAL COURTS STORIES 71–74 
(2010) [hereinafter Meltzer, McCardle]. The Court held that it was “not at liberty 
to inquire into the motives of the legislature.” McCardle, 74 U.S. at 514. “We can 
only examine into its power under the Constitution, and the power to make 
exceptions to the appellate jurisdiction of this court is given by express words.” 
Id. at 513–14. There is certainly debate over how seriously to take McCardle’s 
strong assertion of Congress’s authority under the Exceptions Clause. McCardle 
itself can be read more narrowly in light of the fact that the Court suggested, and 
later confirmed, that a habeas petitioner could prevail under the Judiciary Act of 
1789 despite the Court’s narrow reading of the jurisdiction-stripping act. Meltzer, 
McCardle, supra, at 83. Viewed in this light, McCardle can be reconciled with 
Klein if Klein means only that a court may not withdraw jurisdiction to direct a 
particular result based on the motivation of Congress if there is no other avenue 
for relief. Even this most narrow reading of Klein, however, is in tension with the 
Court’s subsequent rule of decision cases. District of Columbia v. Eslin, 
183 U.S. 62, 65–66 (1901). 
 160. Meltzer, Constitutional Remedies, supra note 85, at 2540. See Jackson, 
supra note 11, at 586 (arguing that Klein might prevent Congress from legislating 
“to require courts to act unconstitutionally”); Lloyd C. Anderson, Congressional 
Control over the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts: A New Threat to James 
Madison’s Compromise, 39 BRANDEIS L.J. 417, 439 (2000) (arguing that “Congress 
cannot direct courts to make decisions that are inconsistent with the Court’s own 
interpretation of the Constitution”); Tyler, supra note 54, at 113 (arguing that 
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In Lawrence Sager’s formulation, Klein stands for the proposition 
that Congress may not “conscript the judiciary in a constitutional 
charade” by forcing it to “act out a . . . morality play.”161 A principle 
that prevents Congress from directing the courts to undertake an 
unconstitutional act is an important limitation on Congress; but, 
it is a principle derivative of the well-established rule that the 
judiciary is tasked with stating what the Constitution requires.162 
In the words of Chief Justice Marshall, “[i]t is emphatically the 
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law 
is.”163 This is an important principle to be sure, but one that does 
not suggest that Klein has any independent force. Rather, this 
reading of Klein may merely restate an obvious principle of 
constitutional law. 
A motivation-based explanation of Klein can also be stated in 
nonconstitutional terms. First, a nonconstitutional version of 
Sager’s morality play formulation of Klein prohibits Congress, out 
of political motivation, from requiring the courts to reach a 
conclusion that the courts lawfully would have been permitted to 
reach in the absence of specific direction by Congress. Klein can be 
read in this way: the appropriations proviso was motivated, in 
part, by the desire of Radical Republicans in Congress to undo 
Padelford, which had smoothed the way for repentant rebels to 
recover funds from the Treasury.164 Viewed in this light, the 
appropriations proviso can be seen as an attempt by Congress to 
give a politically motivated but otherwise constitutional act—
denying compensation to former rebels—the veneer of neutrality 
by involving the federal courts. This reading of Klein is also 
suggested by Young, who argued that Klein might be read to 
                                                                                                     
“Congress may not compel the courts to play an instrumental part in violating” 
the Constitution). 
 161. Sager, supra note 11, at 2528. 
 162. See infra note 163 and accompanying text (considering whether Klein 
states a principle different than Marbury). 
 163. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). This is, in substance, 
Meltzer’s argument. Meltzer, Constitutional Remedies, supra note 85, at 2549 
(arguing that Klein should be read to mean that Congress may not require a 
federal court to act unconstitutionally). 
 164. See Tyler, supra note 54, at 91, 94–95 (providing historical context for 
Klein). 
THE KLEIN RULE OF DECISION PUZZLE 2161 
prohibit Congress from tampering with judicial fact-finding, even 
in nonconstitutional cases.165  
Although the nonconstitutional morality play reading of Klein 
comports with the notion of separation of powers at a high level of 
abstraction, its explanatory power is limited. In a sense, all trials 
are morality plays.166 As Stephanos Bibas has described, trials 
further the substantive aims of the law by allowing the community 
to pronounce judgment, exonerate the innocent, “brand” the guilty, 
and even reintegrate the guilty into society.167 This is precisely how 
Congress relates to the judiciary whenever it enacts law. By 
enacting substantive law, Congress establishes societal rules 
about acceptable and unacceptable conduct.168 And by extending 
jurisdiction to adjudicate claims, Congress enlists the courts in 
making a public demonstration of the acceptability vel non of the 
behavior adjudicated. As a result, if the statute that Congress 
enacts is constitutional, a morality play test cannot distinguish a 
Klein situation from any other lawmaking. Bank Markazi stands 
as a clear example of lawmaking as morality play. In that case, the 
Court upheld, against a Klein challenge, a statute that deemed the 
assets of the Iranian Central Bank to be the assets of the republic 
of Iran, against which there were outstanding but uncollected 
judgments for damages resulting from terrorist activities.169 This 
situation, no less than Klein, forced the Court to carry Congress’s 
                                                                                                     
 165. See Young, Klein, Then and Now, supra note 11, at 314–15 (suggesting 
a limited congressional role in prescribing rules of interpretation). 
 166. See J.D. MORTON, THE FUNCTION OF CRIMINAL LAW IN 1962, at 30 (1962) 
(comparing the aspects of trials to the aspects of plays); see also Stephanos Bibas, 
Harmonizing Substantive Criminal Law Values and Criminal Procedure: The 
Case of Alford and Nolo Contendere Pleas, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1361, 1401 (2003) 
(discussing the dramatic elements of trials); cf. Milner S. Ball, The Play’s the 
Thing: An Unscientific Reflection on Courts Under the Rubric of Theater, 28 STAN. 
L. REV. 81, 98–99 (1975) (discussing the contrast between trials and morality 
plays). 
 167. Bibas, supra note 166, at 1401. 
 168. See MORTON, supra note 166, at 35–37 (describing the relationship 
between law and societal norms). 
 169. See generally Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310 (2016).  A more 
limited claim suggests that Klein prevents the conscription of courts in times of 
deep political dysfunction, as was Reconstruction. Wasserman, supra note 11, at 
215–16. If this ever was a constitutional principle, the Court appears to have 
definitively rejected it in Bank Markazi.  
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banner in an overtly political, even partisan, fight, by requiring it 
to assign legal liability based on Congress’s moral judgment that 
the Iranian bank was responsible for the country of Iran’s acts of 
terrorism.170  
Second, a similar argument suggests that Klein prevents 
Congress from deceiving the electorate about the manner in which 
its legislation alters the legal landscape. Under Martin Redish and 
Christopher Pudelski’s reading, Klein was defective because it led 
the electorate to believe that the decision to deny Klein’s claim was 
a legal decision, cloaked in the authority of neutrality, rather than 
a political one.171 This prevented, the argument goes, the electorate 
from holding politicians accountable for the denial of Klein’s 
claim.172 But, the deception formulation is too broad to distinguish 
Klein from ordinary lawmaking. The deception model of Klein 
assumes that the electorate is familiar with the standing, 
generally applicable law while at the same time unable to 
understand the import of a change in the law.173 Consider Klein 
itself: the deception model assumes that the electorate would have 
been aware of the requirements of the ACPA and the Court’s 
Padelford opinion interpreting it, but unaware that the 
appropriations proviso altered those conditions. The assumption 
that the public pays much attention at all to Congress’s legislative 
activities is contradicted by political science literature, which has 
found that “Americans are almost totally uninformed about 
legislative issues in Washington.”174 So, too, they are unaware of 
the role of the judiciary.175 A fortiori, it is implausible that the 
                                                                                                     
 170. See generally Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. 1310. 
 171. See Redish & Pudelski, supra note 11, at 439 (arguing that Klein can be 
read to require the judiciary to prevent Congress from deceiving the electorate); 
see also Vladek, supra note 11, at 253 (same). 
 172. See Redish & Pudelski, supra note 11, at 439–40 (arguing that “the 
judiciary has the constitutional power and obligation to assure that Congress has 
not deceived the electorate”).  
 173. See id. at 453 (suggesting that courts proceed on the assumption that the 
“electorate is aware of all legislation enacted by its chosen representatives”). 
 174. Warren E. Miller & Donald E. Stokes, Constituency Influence in 
Congress, 57 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 45, 47 (1963). 
 175. See Kathleen Hall Jamieson & Michael Hennessy, Public Understanding 
of and Support for the Courts: Survey Results, 95 GEO. L.J. 899, 899–900 (2007) 
(concluding that public knowledge about the judiciary is minimal). 
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public would be aware both of generally applicable laws and 
Supreme Court interpretations of these laws but unaware of 
subsequent amendments to limit them. Wheeling Bridge stands as 
a poignant example of the limitations of the deception model. No 
less than Klein, the Wheeling Bridge statute can be said to have 
deceived the public by implying that the decision to dissolve the 
injunction against the bridge company was a legal decision rather 
than a political one.176 Nevertheless, the Court upheld this statute, 
a decision that was specifically reaffirmed in Klein.177  
5. May Congress Direct the Court to Rule in Favor of the 
Government? 
Klein contains two statements suggesting the infirmity of a 
statute with the effect of deciding a suit in the government’s favor. 
Chase noted that the proviso could not be given effect because it 
would permit “one party to the controversy to decide it in its own 
favor.”178 Chase later returned to this theme, denouncing the 
proviso for withdrawing the Court’s jurisdiction “because and only 
because its decision, in accordance with settled law, must be 
adverse to the government and favorable to the suitor.”179  
These statements have led some scholars to contemplate a 
Klein principle that prevents the courts from applying a change in 
law that has the effect of destroying a judgment rendered against 
the government.180 Such a rule has intuitive appeal. As Amy 
Ronner noted, the concept of rule of law, at a high level of 
                                                                                                     
 176. See generally Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S 
421 (1855). 
 177. Id. at 431–32. As Young has suggested, the deception formulation is also 
practically “unworkable” and “unmanageable.” Young, Klein, Then and Now, 
supra note 11, at 327–28. 
 178. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 146 (1871). 
 179. Id. at 147. 
 180. See Jackson, supra note 11, at 586 (interpreting Klein to mean that 
Congress cannot deprive courts of the authority necessary to render independent 
judgment); see also Redish & Pudelski, supra note 11, at 447–48 (rejecting the 
importance of the government as a party to Klein); Theodore Eisenberg, 
Congressional Authority to Restrict Lower Federal Court Jurisdiction, 83 YALE 
L.J. 498, 526–27 (1974) (same); Shugerman, supra note 157, at 978 (noting the 
tension between a self-dealing rationale for Klein and Robertson). 
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abstraction at least, is inconsistent with the idea of the 
“government securing for itself a [judicial] victory by a 
Congressional change.”181 Accordingly, Ronner proposed a Klein 
test that would consider, as a factor but not a determinative one, 
whether the statute has the effect of favoring the government.182 
Peter Gerangelos reformulated Ronner’s test, incorporating her 
emphasis on the government’s decision to decide the case in its own 
favor.183 Gordon Young conducted the most elaborate evaluation of 
a Klein principle that turns on the presence of the government as 
a party.184 Young suggests that this reading of Klein is explained 
as an extension of the principle against nonjudicial revision of 
court judgments.185 A rule taking into consideration the presence 
of the government as a party finds support in United States v. 
Sioux Nation of Indians,186 in which the Court upheld a special 
jurisdictional statute that waived the government’s defense of res 
judicata.187 The Court distinguished the facts of Sioux Nation from 
Klein by emphasizing that Klein’s appropriations proviso resolved 
the controversy in favor of the government.188 By contrast, the 
Sioux Nation jurisdictional statute imposed a new legal obligation 
on the government.189 
Despite Sioux Nation, the greater weight of scholarship has 
been less optimistic about the possibility of reading Klein to turn 
on whether the change in law redounds to the benefit of the 
                                                                                                     
 181. Ronner, supra note 11, at 1071–72. 
 182. See id. at 1071 (arguing that whether “legislation has the effect of 
favoring the government as a party” is a factor in Klein). 
 183. See GERANGELOS, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 11, at 178–79 (proposing 
a test for determining the legality of legislation directing judgment). 
 184. See Young, Congressional Regulation, supra note 11, at 1241–44 
(evaluating the significance of the presence of the government as a party to a 
pending case). 
 185. See id. at 1247–48 (suggesting that Klein follows from the principle 
against nonjudicial revision of court judgments). 
 186. 448 U.S. 371 (1980). 
 187. See id. at 407 (upholding a change of law in a pending case). 
 188. See id. at 404–05 (noting that the it was of “obvious importance to the 
Klein holding . . . that Congress was attempting to decide the controversy at issue 
in the Government’s own favor”). 
 189. See id. at 401, 406–07 (describing the jurisdictional statute in Sioux 
Nation). 
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government. Most forcefully, Jackson and Eisenberg point to 
District of Columbia v. Eslin,190 in which the Court upheld a 
withdrawal of jurisdiction that had the effect of nullifying 
judgments payable by the United States.191 Eslin would seem to 
preclude a broad reading of Klein to prohibit withdrawals of 
jurisdiction that favor the United States in pending cases. 
Nevertheless, Jackson does incorporate such a principle into her 
proposed Klein rule, suggesting that Klein may prevent Congress 
from legislating to “force the courts to rule in favor of the 
government” by depriving them of the power to express their 
independent legal judgment.192 As Jackson notes, however, 
subsequent decisions limit the force of this potential explanation 
of Klein by permitting Congress to define the scope of law so 
narrowly as to effectively eliminate the court’s independent legal 
judgment.193  
The more recent Robertson case also challenges a reading of 
Klein that would prohibit Congress from enacting a statute with 
the effect of directing a ruling in favor of the government. In 
Robertson, environmental and logging industry groups brought 
suits against the United States to challenge the government’s 
management of logging activities in Oregon.194 During the 
litigation, Congress enacted a statute to govern logging in the 
Oregon forests that had the effect of ending the ongoing litigation 
in favor of the United States.195 The Court upheld the new statute 
against a Klein challenge:196 As Jed Shugerman argued, Robertson 
precludes reading Klein as a broad prohibition on changes in law 
simply because they have the effect of directing judgment in favor 
of the United States.197 
                                                                                                     
 190. 183 U.S. 62 (1901). 
 191. See id. at 65–66; see also Jackson, supra note 11, at 585–86 (noting the 
tension between Eslin and Klein); Eisenberg, supra note 180, at 526 (same). 
 192. See Jackson, supra note 11, at 587.  
 193. See id. at 586–87 (arguing that the difference between prescribing a new 
rule of decision and directing a particular judgment “is in some measure a matter 
of form”). 
 194. See generally Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc’y, 503 U.S. 429, 433 
(1992). 
 195. Id. at 434–36. 
 196. Id. at 441. 
 197. See Shugerman, supra note 157, at 978–79 (noting the tension between 
2166 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2133 (2017) 
Doctrine aside, other scholars are skeptical of the relevance of 
the presence of the government as a party even as a theoretical 
matter. Redish argued that constitutional theory suggests no 
reason why Congress may not enact statutes that have the effect 
of favoring the government in pending cases.198 Redish is surely 
correct to doubt the Klein Court’s bald assertion that the 
appropriations proviso was defective simply because it allowed 
“one party to the controversy to decide it in its own favor.”199 In a 
number of contexts, our constitutional system appears to tolerate 
almost literal violations of a principle that would prevent an entity 
from deciding a controversy in its own favor.200 For example, in the 
context of administrative law, administrative agencies hear 
countless disputes each year in which an agency, acting both as 
party and adjudicating authority,201 decides a dispute in its own 
favor. Gerangelos, although sympathetic to the argument that the 
presence of the government as a party should matter, argued that 
this proposition is not supported by authority other than Klein 
itself.202  
For these reasons, it is important not to overstate the 
argument that Klein turns on the presence of the government as a 
party or the fact that the statute rendered judgment in the 
government’s favor. If these facts have any continued relevance, 
they must be situated within a defensible theoretical and doctrinal 
framework. As I argue in Part III, this is possible: a principle 
disfavoring governmental self-dealing, which takes these facts into 
                                                                                                     
Klein and Robertson). 
 198. See Redish & Pudelski, supra note 11, at 448 (arguing that Congress may 
change the law to benefit the government as a party in a pending case); see also 
Ratner, supra note 157, at 181 (discussing tension between Klein and McCardle). 
 199. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 146 (1871). 
 200. See Adrian Vermeule, Contra Nemo Iudex in Sua Causa: The Limits of 
Impartiality, 122 YALE L.J. 384, 393–94 (2012) [hereinafter Vermuele, Contra 
Nemo] (arguing that the “structural features of the constitutional system” violate 
an absolute reading of the nemo iudex principle).  
 201. See id. at 393 (asserting that conflicts of interest are a feature of the 
administrative state); see also 5 U.S.C. § 556 (2012) (permitting agencies to 
adjudicate disputes involving the agencies themselves). 
 202. See GERANGELOS, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 11, at 184–85 (arguing 
that Klein is the only case suggesting the relevance of the presence of the 
government as a party to a pending case). 
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account, has deep roots in constitutional history, doctrine, and 
jurisprudence.203 A principle disfavoring governmental 
self-dealing also provides a framework for examining Eslin and 
Robertson and demonstrates how these cases differ from Klein. But 
more on that later. First, we must confront the possibility that 
Klein means nothing at all. 
6. Might Klein Mean Nothing at All? 
It is possible, of course, that Klein means nothing—or at least 
nothing that can be called a distinct and enforceable principle 
concerning the relationship between Congress and the courts.204 
Scholars have argued, alternatively, that Klein is no broader than 
its exceptions, that it stands only for a rule already clear from 
other constitutional principles, and that it is merely a formal 
drafting requirement.  
First, Klein might be no broader than its exceptions. Even at 
the time it was decided, the possible range of applications for Klein 
was quite small. In the early case of United States v. Schooner 
Peggy,205 the Court held that courts must apply changes of law to 
cases pending on appeal.206 In that case, the district court had 
condemned the Schooner Peggy.207 While the case was pending on 
appeal, the United States entered into a treaty with France that 
                                                                                                     
 203. See infra Part III. 
 204. At least, Klein is still good law for its holding that the appropriations 
proviso was invalid because it encroached on the President’s pardon power. This 
is not, however, the full extent of Klein. See Witkowski v. United States, 7 Ct. Cl. 
393, 396–97 (1872) (noting that Klein is not limited to the line between executive 
and legislative power). In subsequent cases, the Court has considered Klein in the 
context of the division of labor between the judicial and legislative departments. 
See, e.g., Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1315 (2016) (discussing Klein 
in the context of the legislative direction of judgment). 
 205. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103 (1801). 
 206. Id. at 110. The Schooner Peggy case comports with the traditional view 
that courts, discovering rather than making law, declare what the law was as well 
as what the law is. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *70–72 (noting that 
judges are “not delegated to pronounce a new law, but to maintain and expound 
the old one”). 
 207. See Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 108 (noting that the vessel had 
been condemned by the trial court). 
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the Court interpreted as requiring the return of the vessel in spite 
of the condemnation.208 The Court held that an appellate court was 
bound to apply the new treaty, even if the trial court decision was 
correct when decided.209 When “subsequent to the judgment and 
before the decision of the appellate court, a law intervenes and 
positively changes the rule which governs, the [new] law must be 
obeyed.”210 This requirement is often referred to as the “Changed 
Law Rule.”211 
Klein can be read as an exception to Schooner Peggy,212 
restricting the application of new law in pending cases on appeal 
in certain circumstances. Nevertheless, this reading is precluded 
by subsequent cases, in which the Court inverted the relationship 
between Schooner Peggy and Klein by expanding the “Changed 
Law Rule” into a wholesale exception to Klein.213 In Robertson, the 
Court implied that the Changed Law Rule was an exception to 
Klein by holding that Congress may always amend or repeal 
existing law, even for the purpose of ending ongoing litigation.214 
Later, in Plaut, the Court explicitly made the Changed Law Rule 
an exception to Klein, holding that its “prohibition does not take 
hold when Congress amend[s] applicable law.”215 And, in Bank 
Markazi, the Court completed the transformation, relying on the 
Changed Law Rule to reach its result. The Court held that Klein 
did not prohibit a statute deeming one entity’s assets available to 
satisfy judgments against another because, by defining the assets 
                                                                                                     
 208. Id. at 108–09. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. at 110. 
 211. See Gerangelos, Pending Cases, supra note 119, at 84 (referring to the 
above-mentioned principle as “the changed law rule”); see also Richard Doidge, Is 
Purely Retroactive Legislation Limited by the Separation of Powers?: Rethinking 
United States v. Klein, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 910, 959 (1994) (same). 
 212. See Young, Congressional Regulation, supra note 11, at 1240–41 (reading 
Klein as an exception to the Changed Law Rule). 
 213. See Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc’y, 503 U.S. 429, 436, 441 (1992) 
(noting that Klein does not apply when Congress has amended the law).  
 214. See id. at 440 (noting that Congress may end litigation by amending the 
law). 
 215. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218 (1995) (internal 
citations omitted). 
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in reference to the funds identified in a pending case, Congress had 
amended applicable law.216 
Bank Markazi appears to confirm, as others have already 
argued, that the Changed Law Rule swallowed Klein altogether. 
Describing the status of Klein after Robertson, William Araiza 
argued that all lawmaking changes the law within the meaning of 
Klein: “[I]f lawmaking is the power to create liability rules and the 
procedural structure for enforcing those rules, then overturning a 
statutory interpretation and amending the underlying statute 
both constitute lawmaking.”217 Araiza’s interpretation has been 
borne out by a number of post-Robertson lower court cases that 
illustrate the vanishingly small space between amending 
applicable law, which is permissible, and prescribing a rule of 
decision in causes pending, which is prohibited.218 In City of New 
York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp.,219 the Second Circuit upheld, over a 
Klein challenge, a statute that terminated identifiable pending 
cases against gun suppliers.220 The City of New York filed suit 
against firearms suppliers, claiming that they created a public 
nuisance.221 While this case was pending, Congress enacted the 
Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act,222 which required the 
immediate dismissal of pending claims against manufacturers or 
sellers of firearms.223 Although this statute directed the dismissal 
of particular, pending cases, the court held that the statute also 
“change[d] the applicable law” because it eliminated liability for 
the defendants in those cases: As a result, it did not violate 
Klein.224 The Second Circuit is not alone; similar cases in the Ninth 
                                                                                                     
 216. Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1323 (2016). 
 217. Araiza, supra note 7119, at 1079; see also GERANGELOS, JUDICIAL 
PROCESS, supra note 11, at 175 (noting that Robertson is in tension with Klein); 
Vermeule, supra note 28, at 424 (same). 
 218. See generally City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 524 F.3d 384 (2d. 
Cir. 2008) (upholding a statute that both amends the law and prescribes a rule of 
decision).  
 219. 524 F.3d 384 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 220. See generally id. 
 221. Id. at 389. 
 222. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7901–7903 (2012). 
 223. See Beretta, 524 F.3d at 389 (citing the Protection of Lawful Commerce 
in Arms Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7901–7903). 
 224. Id. at 396. 
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Circuit and D.C. Circuit reveal that any statute, perhaps, can be 
read as amending applicable law and, as a result, skirt the already 
modest restrictions imposed by Klein.225 
Chief Justice Roberts made this same point in his dissenting 
opinion in Bank Markazi. The Court distinguished the Bank 
Markazi statute from a hypothetical statute declaring that “Smith 
wins” on the ground that the latter, impermissible statute “would 
create no new substantive law.”226 The Chief Justice responded 
that such a statute does in fact create new substantive law: the 
statute provides the new, substantive law that Smith wins.227 
Noting that “[c]hanging the law is simply how Congress acts,” 
Roberts concluded that describing one statute rather than another 
as changing the law is merely conclusory.228 If a “change in law” 
has the broad meaning attributed to it by Roberts, then an 
exception to Klein contingent on whether Congress has changed 
the law is coextensive with Klein itself. 
Second, a number of scholars have formulated Klein principles 
that are no broader than already existing constitutional rules. 
Most relevantly, a number of scholars have suggested that 
Congress may not compel the courts to make untrue statements 
about the law, whether constitutional or otherwise.229 Hart 
suggested that, at least, Congress may not grant federal courts 
jurisdiction contingent on the requirement that they refrain from 
declaring a particular law unconstitutional.230 Meltzer argued that 
                                                                                                     
 225. See Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 565 F.3d 1126, 1139 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that 
Klein does not take hold when Congress amends applicable law); Nat’l Coal. to 
Save Our Mall v. Norton, 269 F.3d 1092, 1097 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (same). 
 226. Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct 1310, 1335 (2016) (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting). 
 227. Id. (“Saying Congress ‘creates new law’ in one case but not another 
simply expresses a conclusion on that issue.”). If there is a difference between 
“Smith wins” and a change in “substantive law,” it has to do with the specificity 
of the statute. But, Bank Markazi strongly suggests that particularity is no longer 
an issue. See id. at 1327 (discussing targeted legislation).  
 228. Id. at 1335. 
 229. See Meltzer, Constitutional Remedies, supra note 85, at 2540 (“Congress 
may not compel the courts to speak a constitutional untruth.”); see also Young, 
Klein, Then and Now, supra note 11, at 314–15 (discussing the limits of 
congressional power to require particular findings of fact); Jackson, supra note 
11, at 586 (stating that Congress may not force courts to act unconstitutionally). 
 230. See Hart, supra note 622, at 1373 (discussing the line between rendering 
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Klein may prevent Congress from compelling the courts “to speak 
a constitutional untruth.”231 Similarly, Jackson suggested that 
Klein might prevent Congress from legislating “to require courts to 
act unconstitutionally.”232 As noted above, this is an important 
principle, but one that does not need Klein as an independent 
source. It is already implicit in Marbury v. Madison’s233 statement 
that it is the duty of the courts to “say what the law is.”234 
Third, scholars have argued that Klein is no more than a 
formal drafting requirement. Under this view, Klein does not 
prevent Congress from doing anything in particular, but it may 
prevent Congress from doing it in a particular way.235 As Evan 
Caminker and Lawrence Sager have explained, it is easy to replace 
language that directs the courts to rule in favor of one party with 
language that guarantees the same result by changing the 
substantive law.236 Consider Chief Justice Roberts’s Bank Markazi 
hypothetical. If, during the pendency of Smith v. Jones, Congress 
enacts a statute that says “in the case of Smith v. Jones, Smith 
wins,” both the Court and Roberts, and probably federal courts 
scholars like Caminker and Sager, would agree that Klein was 
violated.237 But, imagine further that the case of Smith v. Jones 
was a breach of contract action in which the only issue was Jones’s 
                                                                                                     
judgment and actually deciding a case); GERANGELOS, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra 
note 11, at 127 (same). 
 231. Meltzer, Constitutional Remedies, supra note 85, at 2540. 
 232. Jackson, supra note 11, at 586. 
 233. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 234. Id. at 177. Others have suggested that Klein requires that courts must 
be allowed to use “minimally fair procedures.” Young, Klein, Then and Now, supra 
note 11, at 310. This is an important rule, but probably one that is no broader 
than what due process requires. See id. at 308–09 (“This places Klein in what is 
usually the realm of procedural due process.”).  
 235. See Caminker, supra note 11, at 542 (arguing that Klein is a drafting 
requirement). 
 236. See Caminker, supra note 11, at 542 (arguing that a change in 
substantive law can effectively direct judgment in a particular case); Sager, supra 
note 11, at 2526 (same); Gerangelos, Pending Cases, supra note 119, at 84 (same); 
Doidge, supra note 211, at 926 (same). 
 237. See Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1335–36 (2016) (Roberts, 
C.J., dissenting) (arguing that congressional directives to reach a particular 
result are unconstitutional); Caminker, supra note 11, at 541–42 (suggesting that 
Klein may be a drafting principle preventing overly specific direction to courts).  
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defense that he lacked capacity to contract. A statute providing “in 
the case of Smith v. Jones, the defense of lack of capacity to 
contract is abolished” changes the underlying substantive law. 
Although this statute would guarantee the outcome in a pending 
case, it also would avoid Klein’s restrictions under the 
Robertson-Bank Markazi version of the Changed Law Rule. The 
Bank Markazi majority responded to a similar hypothetical by 
noting that it might be unconstitutional, irrespective of Klein, 
because the legislature is bound to be reasonable.238 The Court’s 
response is all but an admission that Klein has no force as an 
independent constitutional principle, but rather is a formality 
easily evaded by competent drafting. 
These arguments strongly suggest that Klein no longer stands 
for an independent and enforceable principle about the 
relationship between Congress and the courts. Although the Court 
has not overruled Klein explicitly, the Court sometimes implicitly 
overrules an old case or allows it to fade away.239 Indeed, one could 
read Eslin, a case remarkable because of its similarity to Klein but 
which fails to distinguish it, or even to cite it, as evidence of Klein’s 
irrelevance.240 It is also possible to read Robertson and Plaut, both 
of which made short work of Klein arguments,241 as a signal that it 
is no longer viable.  
But Bank Markazi suggests that Klein is neither gone nor 
forgotten. Instead, the Court seemed genuinely to wrestle with 
Klein and the other rule of decision cases to discern a workable line 
that distinguishes the direction of judgment from a change in 
substantive law.242 The Court tried to situate Klein within the 
broader context of Article III, explain the significance of its “rule 
                                                                                                     
 238. See Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1326 (noting that a narrowly tailored 
law may be irrational and, therefore, unconstitutional). 
 239. See Bradley Scott Shannon, Overruled by Implication, 33 SEATTLE U. L. 
REV. 151, 154 (2009) (noting that the Court “sometimes overrules prior holdings 
only by implication”). 
 240. See generally District of Columbia v. Eslin, 183 U.S. 62 (1901). 
 241. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218 (1995) 
(invalidating a statute that reopened final judgments without resting on Klein); 
Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc’y, 503 U.S. 429, 441 (1992) (restricting Klein to 
circumstances in which Congress has not amended applicable law). 
 242. See Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1323–26 (drawing a distinction between 
changing substantive law and directing judgment). 
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of decision” language, and reconcile its result with Schooner Peggy, 
Robertson, and Plaut, among other cases.243 In short, the Court 
treated the Klein rule of decision principle as a principle of 
constitutional dimension. Because the Court continues to regard 
Klein as a case of constitutional importance, and because Klein 
reflects a strong intuition about the separation of legislative power 
from judicial power, it is worth exploring whether sense can be 
made of this puzzling opinion. For the purposes of the rest of this 
Article, therefore, I explore what principle animates Klein, 
assuming that it still represents an enforceable constitutional 
principle. 
III. Back into Klein’s Vault 
Bank Markazi is a double-edged sword for the federal courts 
enthusiast seeking an enforceable Klein principle. On one hand, 
Bank Markazi, once again, failed to find a Klein violation in a 
statute that all but guaranteed the result in a pending case.244 And 
the Court rejected, for the first time, the infirmity of legislative 
specification as a possible justification for Klein, undermining the 
persuasive argument that Klein is rooted in concerns about 
targeted legislative action.245 On the other hand, the Court seemed 
to take Klein seriously, raising the possibility that Klein stands for 
an enforceable principle that has not been adequately 
articulated.246 A return to Klein’s vault—that is, a look into the 
reasoning underlying the Court’s cryptic opinion in that case—
reveals that if Klein can be justified today, it can best be viewed as 
a principle that prohibits governmental self-dealing.  
A principle against governmental self-dealing builds on the 
work of scholars, including Vicki Jackson, Gordon Young, Peter 
Gerangelos, and Amy Ronner, who identified and evaluated the 
possibility that Klein turns on whether the government is a party 
                                                                                                     
 243. See id. at 1323–25 (situating Klein among other separation of powers 
cases). 
 244. See id. at 1325 (upholding statute against Klein challenge). 
 245. See id. at 1328 (rejecting the argument that legislation affecting very few 
cases is necessarily unconstitutional). 
 246. See id. at 1334 (discussing Klein). 
2174 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2133 (2017) 
to the dispute.247 As noted above, this latter argument faces 
significant challenges. It is difficult to square with subsequent rule 
of decision cases like Robertson and Eslin, and it is not clear where 
it fits within the American constitutional tradition. A Klein 
principle against governmental self-dealing must grapple with 
these objections. This Part introduces a constitutional principle 
against governmental self-dealing and demonstrates its 
connection to Klein. It concludes by proposing a Klein rule of 
decision principle that comports with the language of Klein and 
situates it within the strong constitutional tradition disfavoring 
governmental self-dealing in other contexts.248 Part IV 
demonstrates the explanatory power of a Klein principle against 
governmental self-dealing by applying it to the rule of decision 
cases most in tension with it.249 Part V provides guidance to lower 
courts by demonstrating how a Klein principle against 
governmental self-dealing can apply to cases that will arise in the 
future.250 
A. What is Self-Dealing? 
Before describing how a principle against self-dealing can 
solve Klein’s rule of decision puzzle, it is necessary to define 
self-dealing and explain how self-dealing can apply to an 
institution like Congress. 
1. Self-Dealing in the American Constitutional Tradition 
A person self-deals when he takes an official action to confer a 
private benefit on himself.251 Self-dealing in the context of public 
                                                                                                     
 247. Supra Part II.C.5.  
 248. See infra Part III (introducing a principle against governmental self-
dealing). 
 249. See infra Part IV (applying the principle against self-dealing to existing 
cases). 
 250. See infra Part V (applying the principle against self-dealing to 
hypothetical cases). 
 251. See KERNAGHAN & LANGFORD, supra note 34, at 142–43 (defining 
self-dealing). 
THE KLEIN RULE OF DECISION PUZZLE 2175 
office, a special case of political corruption,252 has long been 
disfavored in Anglo-American jurisprudence. Dr. Bonham’s 
Case,253 an English authority better known for its lasting effect on 
American legal philosophy than on British law, is often cited as a 
source for an American principle against governmental 
self-dealing.254 In Bonham’s Case, Chief Judge Coke opined that 
the Royal College of Physicians did not have the power to fine and 
imprison Bonham for practicing medicine in London without the 
College’s permission.255 Coke reasoned that members of the 
College “cannot be judges, ministers, and parties; judges to give 
sentence or judgment; ministers to make summons; and parties to 
have the moiety of the forfeiture.”256 Viewing Dr. Bonham’s Case 
through the lens of self-dealing, the problem with the institutional 
arrangement of the College of Physicians was that its members 
both had the power to fine Dr. Bonham and stood to benefit from 
the fines imposed by the College.257 
Coke’s disapproval of official self-dealing resonated with 
republican principles espoused during the revolutionary period.258 
                                                                                                     
 252. See Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, supra note 33, at 373–74 
(describing political corruption to include self-interested use of public power); 
TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN AMERICA, supra note 33, at 38 (describing corruption 
as the exercise of public prerogatives for private gain); Balkin, supra note 33, at 
49–50 (describing republicanism and the public good). 
 253. 77 Eng. Rep. 638 (1610). 
 254. See id. at 652 (invalidating institutional arrangement that reflected 
self-dealing); see also Vermeule, Contra Nemo, supra note 200, at 384–86 n.6 
(noting connection between Bonham’s Case and a principle against self-dealing); 
see also Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 428–29 (1995) 
(suggesting the importance of a principle against self-dealing); Brian C. Kalt, 
Note, Pardon Me?: The Constitutional Case Against Presidential Self-Pardons, 
106 YALE L.J. 779, 787 (1996) (describing self-dealing in constitutional design); cf. 
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *91–92 (noting that “it is unreasonable 
that any man should determine his own quarrel”). 
 255. See Bonham’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 646 (holding that the college did not 
have the power to fine and imprison Bonham); R.H. Helmholz, Bonham’s Case, 
Judicial Review, and the Law of Nature, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 325, 326 (2009) 
(discussing Coke’s opinion). 
 256. Bonham’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 652. 
 257. Vermeule, Contra Nemo, supra note 200, at 384–86 & n.6 (noting the 
connection between Bonham’s Case and a principle against self-dealing). 
 258. See Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, supra note 33, at 373–74 
(describing views about self-dealing in the eighteenth century); TEACHOUT, 
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In Calder v. Bull,259 the early Supreme Court echoed Dr. Bonham’s 
Case when reasoning that a law that “makes a man a Judge in his 
own cause” is “contrary to the great first principles of the social 
compact, [and] cannot be considered a rightful exercise of 
legislative authority.”260 The Court’s statement in Calder reflected 
the republican virtue of “disinterestedness” that preoccupied the 
generation that framed the Constitution.261 This principle suggests 
that citizens who are free from financial dependence are best able 
to execute their official duties impartially.262 Members of the 
revolutionary generation idealized the Roman hero Cincinnatus, 
who served his country when he was needed and then, refusing 
official rewards, returned to civilian life when his service was 
complete.263 And if they idealized Cincinnatus, they idolized 
George Washington, the “American Cincinnatus” who both refused 
compensation for serving as head of the Continental Army and 
later resigned his military commission to the Continental 
Congress at the end of the War of Independence.264 To many 
members of the revolutionary generation, public offices were 
burdens to be borne by exceptional citizens, like Washington, 
rather than plum posts to be exploited.265 
                                                                                                     
CORRUPTION IN AMERICA, supra note 33, at 9 (describing American views of 
corruption); PARILLO, supra note 33, at 9 (describing eighteenth century American 
aspiration to separate governmental power from individual interests). 
 259. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798). 
 260. Id. at 388. 
 261. See GORDON WOOD, REVOLUTIONARY CHARACTERS, supra note 38, at 16–
20 (describing the virtue of disinterestedness); PARILLO, supra note 33, at 10 
(describing the civic republican ideal of official disinterestedness). 
 262. See Gordon Wood, Classical Republicanism and the American 
Revolution, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 13, 23–26 (1990) [hereinafter Wood, Classical 
Republicanism] (discussing the connection between financial independence and 
disinterestedness); PARILLO, supra note 33, at 9–10 (describing American 
attitudes about the financial security of public officials). 
 263. See Jason S. Lantzer, Washington as Cincinnatus: A Model of 
Leadership, in GEORGE WASHINGTON: FOUNDATION OF PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP 
AND CHARACTER 33 (2001) (describing parallels between the lives of George 
Washington and Cincinnatus ). 
 264. See id. at 41–43 (describing deliberate retirement of Washington from 
public life). 
 265. See WOOD, REVOLUTIONARY CHARACTERS, supra note 38, at 16–20 
(discussing attitudes toward class and public office in the eighteenth century); see 
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None of these idealized images of the members of the 
generation that framed the Constitution should suggest that 
public actors during this period were immaculately free from 
self-interest. Nicholas Parillo has shown that the revolutionary 
generation’s belief in official disinterestedness coexisted with 
behaviors that modern sensibilities would classify as 
self-dealing.266 For example, customs officers received a share of 
goods that were forfeited, creating an incentive for the officers to 
confiscate goods. Perhaps even more surprisingly, prosecutors 
“received a fee for every case they brought to trial,” encouraging 
more prosecutions.267 Indeed, even Washington, normally so 
scrupulous about his public reputation, undertook official decisions 
that benefitted him personally.268 When he chose the location for 
the federal district that would become the District of Columbia, he 
picked an area in close proximity to land owned by him and his 
family.269 The result, as Washington foresaw, was “an immediate 
rise in the value of his land.”270  
This mixed historical record complicates the story of 
self-dealing during the framing period. Nevertheless, in certain 
key ways, the republican “dream” of separating government power 
                                                                                                     
also Wood, Classical Republicanism, supra note 262, at 23–24 (describing the 
obligation of exceptional men to hold office in the revolutionary era). 
 266. See PARILLO, supra note 33, at 40–42 (describing the eighteenth century 
practice of providing bounties and moieties to public officers for performing the 
duties of public office). 
 267. Id.  
 268. See Tillman, supra note 35, at 764–66 (describing George Washington’s 
business transactions with the government). 
 269. See BOWLING, supra note 35, at 213–14 (arguing that Washington had an 
economic interest in the placement of the capital). 
 270. Id. at 214. Just as Washington alternately exhibited disinterested and 
self-interested behavior, so too did other prominent members of the framing 
generation. John Marshall famously recused himself from Martin v. Hunter’s 
Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816), because he had a small but personal stake 
in the outcome of the case. See SMITH, supra note 38, at 429 (describing Marshall’s 
decision to recuse himself). Earlier, however, he authored Marbury v. Madison, 
although it was his omission, as Secretary of State, that was responsible for 
Marbury failing to receive his commission. See ALBERT JEREMIAH BEVERIDGE, 3 
THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 124 (1919) (describing historical background of 
Marbury v. Madison). 
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from self-interest271 survived the realities of its lived experience. 
Madison defended the structure of the proposed United States 
government on the theory that the design of its institutions would 
minimize self-dealing.272 As Publius, Madison argued that “[n]o 
man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, because his interest 
would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt 
his integrity.”273 From this simple premise, Madison advanced a 
system of representative democracy to minimize the ill effects of 
self-interested decision-making.274 
Aside from the overall structure of the government, a number 
of other clauses of the Constitution confirm the importance of 
minimizing self-dealing to the American constitutional tradition. 
The Constitution precludes the Vice President from presiding over 
a Senate trial of a President who has been impeached.275 This 
clause can best be explained as an anti-self-dealing device. 
Because the Vice President would benefit personally and directly 
from the conviction and removal of the President, the Constitution 
precludes the official involvement of the Vice President in the 
process.276 Similarly, the Constitution’s Twenty-Seventh 
Amendment (proposed, incidentally, in 1789) prevents a pay raise 
for Congress from taking effect until after an intervening 
congressional election.277 This Amendment prevents all members 
of the House and some members of the Senate from voting for a 
raise that they will necessarily enjoy.278 Akhil Amar has argued 
that even the Bill of Rights, normally considered to be a protection 
for individual rights against the majority, may also be viewed as a 
                                                                                                     
 271. See PARILLO, supra note 33, at 9 (describing the early American 
aspiration of dividing private interests from public power). 
 272. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 39, at 124. 
 273. Id. 
 274. Id. 
 275. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (providing that the Chief Justice shall 
preside over proceedings when the President is tried in the Senate). 
 276. See Amar & Amar, supra note 41, at 121–22 (arguing that the 
Constitution is designed, in part, to prevent self-dealing). 
 277. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXVII (“No law varying the compensation for 
the services of the Senators and Representatives shall take effect, until an 
election of Representatives shall have intervened.”). 
 278.  Id. (delaying the effect of changes in congressional compensation). 
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way to prevent governmental self-dealing.279 The First 
Amendment, for example, protects speech and petition, which are 
ways for the people to ensure that government officials do not 
insulate themselves from public scrutiny, thereby entrenching 
themselves in office.280 
2. Who is the “Self” in Self-Dealing? 
In order to explain why a principle against self-dealing 
accounts for the result in Klein, it is necessary to determine 
whether the “self” that can self-deal includes an institution, like 
Congress, with institutional rather than personal interests. As a 
literal statement, self-dealing appears to apply only to an 
individual who acts in a public capacity for his own private benefit. 
The paradigmatic example is a judge deciding a case in which she 
is a litigant.281 
The self may be interpreted more broadly to describe a person 
contributing to a decision that would confer a particular benefit on 
himself.282 This is the sense in which self-dealing was the basis for 
the result in Dr. Bonham’s Case.283 Members of the College could 
not be “judges, ministers, and parties”284 because they benefitted 
from fines paid to the College. A decision of this type is less directly 
self-interested than a judge deciding a case to which she literally 
is a party, but each of the College’s members had a personal, albeit 
                                                                                                     
 279. Akhil Reed Amar, Some Comments on “The Bill of Rights as a 
Constitution,” 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y, 99, 100, 105 (1992). 
 280. See id. (describing the structural components of the Bill of Rights). 
 281. See Vermeule, Contra Nemo, supra note 200, at 384 (considering whether 
there is a constitutional value preventing a person from being a judge in his own 
case); Dr. Bonham’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 638, 652 (1610) (noting that, in the same 
case, an institution’s members may not be “judges to give sentence of judgment; 
ministers to make summons; and parties to have the moiety of the forfeiture”). 
 282. See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 520–23 (1927) (holding that a person’s 
rights are violated when his case is heard by a judge who “has a direct, personal, 
substantial, pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion against him in his case”). 
 283. Bonham’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 638, 646 (1610). See Vermeule, Contra 
Nemo, supra note 200, at 384–86 (arguing that the principle against self-dealing 
is often linked to Bonham’s Case); see also Kalt, supra note 254, at 779 (discussing 
self-dealing). 
 284. Bonham’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 652. 
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nonexclusive, interest in the outcome of the case. As a result, it is 
possible to see how the arrangement at issue in Dr. Bonham’s Case 
can be considered self-dealing. The Constitution speaks to 
self-dealing of this variety: the Twenty-Seventh Amendment 
prevents a pay raise for Congress from taking effect until after an 
intervening congressional election.285  
Even more broadly, self-dealing might describe a person who 
contributes to a group decision that stands to benefit him only as 
a member of a class, but not in his individual capacity. This is the 
sense in which Madison invoked the concept when describing 
legislative activities. In Federalist, No. 10, Madison wrote that 
“[n]o man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, because his 
interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, 
corrupt his integrity.”286 But Madison’s use of this phrase was 
metaphorical because the subject of Madison’s aphorism is 
legislative rather than judicial activity.287 Madison continued:  
With equal, nay with greater reason, a body of men are unfit to 
be both judges and parties at the same time; yet what are many 
of the most important acts of legislation, but so many judicial 
determinations, not indeed concerning the rights of single 
persons, but concerning the rights of large bodies of citizens?288  
In Madison’s metaphor, legislative activities are aggregated 
judicial determinations, resolving disputes among classes rather 
than individuals.289 And legislators are not only the judges making 
these determinations, but they are also the parties who stand to 
benefit from the outcome. As Madison wrote: “Is a law proposed 
concerning private debts? It is a question to which the creditors are 
parties on one side and the debtors on the other.”290 Under this 
description, self-dealing might extend to legislative deliberations, 
                                                                                                     
 285. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVII (“No law varying the compensation for the 
services of the Senators and Representatives shall take effect, until an election of 
Representatives shall have intervened.”). 
 286. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 39, at 124–25. 
 287. See Vermeule, Contra Nemo, supra note 200, at 391 (noting that 
Madison’s use of phrase was metaphorical). 
 288. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 39, at 124–25. 
 289. See Vermeule, Contra Nemo, supra note 200, at 391 (noting metaphorical 
use of the language of judging). 
 290. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 39, at 124–25. 
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but it would still be confined to situations of “corruption,” that is, 
a “self-serving use of public power for private ends.”291 
But, the self-interestedness criticized by the Court in Klein did 
not involve even this metaphoric use of the term “self.” The Klein 
Court did not suggest that any members of Congress stood to 
benefit, even as members of a class, from denying claims like 
Klein’s. Members of Congress benefitted financially from the 
appropriations proviso only in the de minimis sense that, as 
taxpayers, they stood to share in the savings to public fisc. 
Nevertheless, the Court was emphatic that the appropriations 
proviso was impermissible because it allowed “one party to the 
controversy to decide it in its own favor.”292 In so doing, Klein 
treated Congress as the party bound by a principle against 
self-dealing.293 From Klein, therefore, we learn that the “self” that 
is restrained by a principle of self-dealing can be broader than a 
person or class with pecuniary interest in the outcome of a dispute. 
Rather, Congress as an institution may be “self-interested” when 
directing a decision in favor of the United States, even if the 
members that make up Congress are not.294 This type of 
self-dealing, which has been called “institutional self-dealing,”295 is 
the subject of Klein’s self-dealing principle. 
                                                                                                     
 291. Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, supra note 33, at 373–74. 
 292. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 146 (1871). 
 293. See TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN AMERICA, supra note 33, at 68 (noting 
extension of the principle of self-dealing to legislative activity). 
 294. See United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 898 (1996) (describing 
the self-interest of the government).  This is the sense in which Hamilton used 
the phrase. In Federalist, No. 80, he relied on this principle to describe why 
federal courts rather than state courts should hear cases between states or 
citizens of different states. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 447 (Alexander 
Hamilton) (Peter Smith ed., 1987) (federal rather than state tribunals should 
hear cases involving states because “[n]o man ought certainly to be a judge in his 
own cause”). 
 295. See Aziz Z. Huq, Enforcing (But Not Defending) ‘Unconstitutional’ Laws, 
98 VA. L. REV. 1001, 1086 (2012) (describing institutional self-dealing); Vermeule, 
Contra Nemo, supra note 200, at 389 (same). 
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B. Klein Disfavors Governmental Self-Dealing 
A close look at the structure of Klein’s argument reveals that 
self-dealing is the closest thing that can be considered the rationale 
for its rule of decision language. Although the Court was clear that 
a statute prescribing a rule of decision in a pending case was 
constitutionally problematic, it did not say precisely why. After 
describing the statute, the Court asks: “Can we do so [that is, apply 
the proviso,] without allowing one party to the controversy to 
decide it in its own favor? Can we do so without allowing that the 
legislature may prescribe rules of decision to the Judicial 
Department of the government in cases pending before it?”296 It 
answers: “We think not.”297 
This passage, although far from a model of clarity, suggests 
that there is something wrong with a statute that allows one party 
to a controversy to decide it in its own favor. It does not, however, 
explain what, if any, is the connection between this concern and its 
rule of decision language. This explanation comes later, in the last 
paragraph of the opinion’s rule of decision section. Summing up 
the previous several pages of its opinion, Chase asks whether 
Congress can “prescribe a rule in conformity with which the court 
must deny to itself the jurisdiction thus conferred, because and 
only because its decision, in accordance with settled law, must be 
adverse to the government and favorable to the suitor? This 
question seems to us to answer itself.”298 In this passage, the Court 
ties together all of the themes it introduced throughout the opinion 
until this point, including the withdrawal of jurisdiction, 
prescription of a rule of decision, retroactivity, deviation from the 
standing law, the motivation of Congress, and favoritism to the 
government.299 But, unlike the rest of the discussion, this last 
sentence suggests that all of these themes are organized around 
the Court’s concern with self-dealing; that is, Congress’s 
interference with the Court of Claims’s judgment was 
constitutionally defective “because and only because its decision” 
                                                                                                     
 296. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 146. 
 297. Id. 
 298. Id. 
 299. See id. (holding that Congress overstepped the constitutional boundary 
separating the legislative and judicial branches). 
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was “adverse to the government and favorable to the suitor.”300 Put 
another way, the Court’s concern appears to be one of self-dealing; 
that is, Congress took advantage of its otherwise lawful power to 
establish federal court jurisdiction to benefit itself as a party in an 
ongoing dispute. 
C. Self-Dealing and the Constitution 
As the above analysis reveals, a principle discouraging the 
government from self-dealing may explain Klein’s result. Although 
it has gained relatively little scholarly or judicial traction,301 it does 
reflect one of a few concerns that the Klein Court emphasized,302 
and possibly was its primary concern. Of course, reading Klein as 
a statement about self-dealing would be a thin explanation for its 
result if Klein were unique in constitutional doctrine for stating 
this principle. Redish made this objection when he argued that 
constitutional doctrine and theory provide no reason to prevent 
Congress from enacting statutes that have the effect of favoring 
the government in pending cases.303 Gerangelos voiced the same 
concern, arguing that a Klein principle that takes into account the 
status of the government as a party fails to connect this insight to 
other areas of constitutional law.304  
But, contrary to these objections, Klein is not alone in 
suggesting the constitutional importance of a principle against 
self-dealing. Even apart from Klein’s rule of decision principle, a 
principle against governmental self-dealing animates several lines 
                                                                                                     
 300. Id. 
 301. Cf. GERANGELOS, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 11, at 185 (considering 
the relevance of the government as a party to the Klein question); Ronner, supra 
note 11, at 1071 (same); Young, Congressional Regulation, supra note 11, at 1249 
(same). 
 302. See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 147 (1871) (rejecting 
the proviso “because and only because its decision, in accordance with settled law, 
must be adverse to the government and favorable to the suitor”). 
 303. See Redish & Pudelski, supra note 11, at 448 (noting Congress’s broad 
authority to benefit the government as a party in a pending case); see also Ratner, 
supra note 157, at 181 (noting the tension between McCardle and Klein). 
 304. See GERANGELOS, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 11, at 185 (arguing that 
a Klein principle rooted in the distinction between government as regulator and 
government as sovereign is not supported by doctrine other than Klein). 
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of constitutional law cases, including Contract, Due Process, and 
Ex Post Facto Clause doctrine.305 The broad commitment to 
limiting governmental self-dealing described by these other 
constitutional doctrines answers the objection that a Klein 
principle against self-dealing is unique in constitutional law.306 
These cases also provide parameters for evaluating how a value 
against self-dealing could operate in the Klein context.307  
1. Contract Clause Doctrine is Driven by a Principle Against 
Governmental Self-Dealing. 
The Supreme Court reads the Contract Clause to embody a 
principle against self-dealing by state governments.308 The 
Contract Clause prohibits the states from enacting any “Law 
impairing the Obligations of Contract.”309 Despite the 
absolute-sounding nature of its prohibition, the strictness of the 
clause’s application turns on whether the statute impairs private 
obligations only or instead relieves the state government of its own 
obligations.310 When a state enacts a statute that impairs private 
obligations, like a statute impairing mortgage obligations between 
borrowers and lenders, the Court reviews the validity of the breach 
under a deferential standard akin to rational basis.311 By contrast, 
when the Court reviews statutes repudiating contractual 
                                                                                                     
 305. See infra Parts III.C.1–3 (describing the connection between 
constitutional doctrine and principle against self-dealing). 
 306. Cf. Redish & Pudelski, supra note 11, at 448 (arguing that constitutional 
theory does not support a Klein principle that turns on whether the government 
is a party to a pending case). 
 307. See infra Part IV (applying principle against self-dealing). 
 308. See U.S. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 17 (1977) (holding that 
“the Contract Clause limits the power of the States to modify their own 
contracts”). 
 309. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
 310. See United States Trust, 431 U.S. at 22–23, 29–31 (distinguishing 
between modification of rights related to public contracts and private contracts). 
 311. See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 438, 444–45 
(1934) (recognizing that laws intended to regulate existing contractual 
relationships must be reasonable and necessary to serve a legitimate public 
purpose). 
THE KLEIN RULE OF DECISION PUZZLE 2185 
obligations to which the state itself is a party, it does not defer to 
the state’s decision to breach its contractual obligation.312  
The Court rests its distinction between public and private 
contracts on the assumption that the state is an interested party 
when it makes the decision to breach its own contractual 
obligations.313 As the Court described in United States Trust Co. of 
New York v. New Jersey,314 deference to a state’s decision to impair 
contractual obligations is based on the premise that, normally, a 
state is acting for a public purpose.315 There will be winners and 
losers as a result of the state’s decision to breach a generally 
applicable set of contractual obligations, to be sure; but the 
legislature, rather than a court, is best situated to weigh the costs 
and benefits created by the impairment.316 By contrast, when the 
state itself is a party to a contract, deference to legislative 
judgment about whether to breach that obligation is not 
appropriate.317 Unlike in the case of a purely private obligation, 
when the state has the ability to breach its own contractual 
obligation, it has the power to pick itself as a winner.318 As a result, 
the Court held, deference to the state “is not appropriate because 
the State’s self-interest is at stake.”319  Because deference is not 
warranted to the state’s self-interested decision, the Court 
interprets the Contract Clause strictly when a state enacts 
legislation breaching its own financial obligations.320 The Court 
has maintained its United States Trust distinction, refusing to 
                                                                                                     
 312. See United States Trust, 431 U.S. at 22–23, 29–31 (distinguishing 
between modification of rights related to public contracts and private contracts). 
 313. See id. (holding that “complete deference to a legislative assessment of 
reasonableness and necessity is not appropriate because the State’s self-interest 
is at stake”). 
 314. 431 U.S. 1 (1977). 
 315. See id. at 25 (describing reserved powers doctrine).  
 316. See id. at 22–23 (noting that “courts properly defer to legislative 
judgment as to the necessity and reasonableness of a particular measure”). 
 317. Id. at 25–26 (holding that “complete deference . . . is not appropriate 
because the State's self-interest is at stake”).  
 318. See id. at 26 (“If a State could reduce its financial obligations whenever 
it wanted to spend the money for what it regarded as an important public purpose, 
the Contract Clause would provide no protection at all.”). 
 319. Id. at 25–26 (emphasis added). 
 320. Id. at 24, 26. 
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uphold state breaches of contractual obligations when the state 
itself is a party to the contracts it impairs.321 In light of this 
distinction, which is not suggested either by the text or history of 
the Contract Clause,322 the Court’s self-dealing rationale appears 
to be driving the doctrinal result in United States Trust.323 
2. Due Process Doctrine Reflects a Principle Against 
Governmental Self-Dealing 
The Court’s bifurcated approach to the Contract Clause came 
as a surprise to scholars and attracted a good deal of criticism.324 
But, this surprise may have been unwarranted; long before United 
States Trust, the Court expressed a similar concern about 
governmental self-dealing in the context of the Fifth Amendment’s 
Due Process Clause.325 In Perry v. United States,326 the petitioner 
held bonds issued by the United States.327 Congress disavowed its 
                                                                                                     
 321. See Energy Res. Grp., Inc. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 412–
13 (1983) (noting that a stricter level of scrutiny applies under the Contract 
Clause when a state alters its own contractual obligations). 
 322. See Evan C. Zoldan, The Permanent Seat of Government, 14 N.Y.U. J. 
LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 163, 205 (2011) [hereinafter Zoldan, Permanent Seat] (noting 
arguments that neither the text nor history of the Constitution supports the 
bifurcation of the Contract Clause). 
 323. Because the Contract Clause applies only to the states and not Congress, 
it may be argued that mistrust of state legislatures prompted the Court’s 
heightened scrutiny of state decisions to breach their own obligations. However, 
as described below, the Court has imposed a parallel distinction against Congress 
through the Due Process Clause. Infra Part III.C.2. This suggests that a concern 
about self-dealing, rather than federalism, animates Contract Clause doctrine. 
 324. See Richard A. Epstein, Toward a Revitalization of the Contract Clause, 
51 U. CHI. L. REV. 703, 718–19 (1984) (arguing that the express language of the 
Contract Clause does not distinguish between private and public contracts); 
Michael W. McConnell, Contract Rights and Property Rights: A Case Study in the 
Relationship Between Individual Liberties and Constitutional Structure, 76 
CALIF. L. REV. 267, 293–94 (1988) (arguing that United States Trust’s conclusion 
is “precisely backwards”). 
 325. See Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330, 346 (1935) (discussing the 
government’s ability to alter the terms of an agreement which later becomes 
disadvantageous to it). 
 326. 294 U.S. 330 (1935). 
 327. See id. at 346 (describing the obligation owed by the United States). 
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obligation to redeem the bonds in accordance with their terms.328 
The Supreme Court rebuffed Congress, holding that the United 
States is not “free to ignore that pledge and alter the terms of its 
obligations in case a later Congress finds their fulfillment 
inconvenient.”329 Importantly, the Court held that there is a 
distinction between the power of the government to regulate 
contractual obligations generally and the “power of the Congress 
to alter or repudiate the substance of its own engagements.”330 
Although Congress has a freer hand to regulate private contracts, 
the Court specifically rejected the government’s argument that, as 
a sovereign, Congress could not bind itself by contract.331 The 
power to enter into binding contracts is itself a sovereign power, 
the Court noted; it reasoned, therefore, that disclaiming a previous 
contractual obligation was as much a repudiation of sovereignty as 
fulfilling it.332 
The Court has reaffirmed Perry’s essential point about 
governmental self-dealing. In United States v. Winstar Corp.,333 
the Court wrestled with the same question posed in Perry and, 
indeed, United States Trust: that is, how does the law 
accommodate the government’s prerogative to legislate with its 
“obligation to honor its contracts.”334 The Winstar Court held that 
the appropriate balance depends on whether the government’s 
breach of contract is due to a sovereign act or whether the breach 
is simply a repudiation by the “Government as contractor.”335 The 
difficult question, the Court noted, is how to distinguish between 
the government as contractor and the government as regulating 
sovereign.336 The Court suggested a mechanism that, like its 
Contract Clause analysis, resonates with a self-dealing rationale. 
If a statute’s impact on the government’s financial obligations is 
“merely incidental to the accomplishment of a broader 
                                                                                                     
 328.  Id. at 347.  
 329. Id. at 350. 
 330. Id. at 350–51 (emphasis added). 
 331. Id. at 350. 
 332. Id. at 353–54. 
 333. 518 U.S. 839 (1996). 
 334. Id. at 896. 
 335. Id.  
 336. Id.  
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governmental objective,” it will be considered a sovereign act.337 
However, the “greater the Government’s self-interest . . . the more 
suspect becomes the claim that its private contracting partners 
ought to bear the financial burden.”338 Indeed, if “a substantial part 
of the impact of the Government’s action rendering performance 
impossible falls on its own contractual obligations,” the 
government will not be able to claim any sovereign act defense at 
all.339 Put simply, the Court suggested that the government’s 
self-interest determines whether it must be bound by its 
contractual obligations. When the government’s self-interest is 
low, it has more leeway to take action with the effect of abrogating 
its obligations. But, the government’s self-interest is presumed—
perhaps definitively established—when a “substantial part” of the 
impact of the new rule benefits the government at the expense of 
a party who bears the brunt of the change in law.340  
3. Ex Post Facto Clause Doctrine Reflects a Principle Against 
Governmental Self-Dealing 
The Contract Clause and Due Process Clause lines of cases 
discussed above are similar because they reflect self-dealing in the 
context of breaches of financial obligations. Indeed, it makes sense 
that self-dealing concerns would come up most often in these cases. 
Importantly, however, the Court’s concern with self-dealing 
transcends the financial context. In the criminal context, too, 
constitutional doctrine reflects an anti-self-dealing rationale. In 
Carmell v. Texas,341 the Court considered whether a retrospective 
change in an evidentiary rule violated the Ex Post Facto Clause.342 
                                                                                                     
 337. Id. at 898. 
 338. Id. (emphasis added). 
 339. Id. 
 340. Id. 
 341. 529 U.S. 513 (2000). 
 342. See id. at 516 (noting that not every retrospective change in rules of 
evidence is unconstitutional); see also Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390 
(1798) (opining that the Ex Post Facto Clause prohibits, inter alia, “[e]very law 
that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different, testimony, 
than the law required at the time of the commission of the offence, in order to 
convict the offender” (emphasis added)). 
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A state rule of evidence required convictions for certain sexual 
offenses to be based both on testimony from the victim and 
corroborating evidence.343 The rule was amended to permit 
convictions for these offenses based solely on the victim’s 
testimony, thereby lowering the amount of evidence needed to 
convict.344 The application of the new law to conduct that occurred 
before its enactment reduced the amount and kind of evidence 
needed to convict a person;345 as a result, the Court held that the 
statute violated the Ex Post Facto Clause.346 But, the Court noted, 
not every rule of evidence, if altered, implicates ex post facto 
concerns.347 Rather, the evidentiary amendment at issue was 
defective because it retroactively altered the rules “in a way that 
is advantageous only to the State.”348 Some evidentiary rules, the 
Court noted, are “evenhanded;” that is, “they may benefit either 
the State or the defendant in any given case.”349 For example, a 
change in a witness competency rule that retrospectively permits 
a type of witness (like a convicted felon) to testify does not 
“necessarily run in the State’s favor.”350 It may help the 
government convict in some cases but, in others, it will aid the 
defense.351 By contrast, rules that lower the amount of evidence 
needed to convict have only one result: they “always run in the 
prosecution’s favor because they always make it easier to convict 
the accused.”352 
Carmell reads a self-dealing rationale into the Ex Post Facto 
Clause. The Court invalidated the retroactive application of a law 
in a criminal case, but only because the change in law could benefit 
                                                                                                     
 343. Carmell, 529 U.S. at 516.  
 344. Id.  
 345. See id. at 531 (noting that the state law decreased the amount of evidence 
needed to convict). 
 346. See id. at 531 (holding that the state law falls within Calder’s fourth 
category of prohibited ex post facto laws). 
 347. Id. 
 348. Id. at 533. 
 349. Id. at 533 n.23. 
 350. Id. at 546. 
 351. See id. at 546–47 (distinguishing between even-handed changes in law 
and changes that always inure to the benefit of the government). 
 352. Id. at 546.  
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the government alone. Viewed in this light, the self-dealing 
rationale appears to be doing the doctrinal work in Carmell; a 
legislature has broad authority to alter the laws of evidence, even 
retroactively, but only if the change could benefit a defendant as 
well as the government. A rule that only benefits the government 
is self-dealing and, therefore, prohibited as an ex post facto law. 
D. Klein’s Principle Reformulated 
The Contract, Due Process, and Ex Post Facto Clauses cover 
different factual situations and reflect different goals. 
Nevertheless, reading together the doctrine from these disparate 
lines of cases reveals that they all reflect the tension between the 
legislature’s right to achieve a public objective and its questionable 
power to benefit itself at the expense of a member of the public.353 
The Court reconciles this tension by emphasizing what may be 
called a constitutional principle against governmental 
self-dealing.354 When a statute has broadly applicable results, and 
applies evenhandedly to the government and non-governmental 
entities alike, it represents broad governmental policy rather than 
self-dealing. By contrast, when a statute is drawn narrowly to 
benefit the government in a particular set of cases, or necessarily 
will run to the advantage of the government in all situations, a 
statute self-deals within the meaning of this principle.355 
                                                                                                     
 353. See United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 896 (1996) (noting that 
“some line has to be drawn . . . between regulatory legislation . . . and, on the 
other hand, statutes tainted by a governmental objective of self-relief”); U.S. Tr. 
Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 25–26 (1977) (noting that “in reviewing 
economic and social regulation . . . courts properly defer to legislative judgment 
as to the necessity and reasonableness of a particular measure . . . . [H]owever, 
complete deference to a legislative assessment of reasonableness and necessity is 
not appropriate because the State’s self-interest is at stake.”); Carmell v. Texas, 
529 U.S. 513, 533 n.23 (2000) (stating that not “every rule that has an effect on 
whether a defendant can be convicted implicates the Ex Post Facto Clause” even 
though they might be unfair). 
 354. See Winstar, 518 U.S. at 896–97 (evaluating statute reflecting 
government self-interest); United States Trust, 431 U.S. at 25–26 (same); 
Carmell, 529 U.S. at 533 n.23 (same). 
 355. See Winstar, 518 U.S. at 896–97 (evaluating statute reflecting 
government self-interest); United States Trust, 431 U.S. at 25–26 (same); 
Carmell, 529 U.S. at 533 n.23 (same). 
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A principle against governmental self-dealing has important 
implications for understanding the proper functions of the 
executive and judicial branches as well as the legislative branch. 
Although the implications for the executive and judicial branches 
are important, they are beyond the scope of this Article.356 The 
remainder of this Article will address the implications of a 
constitutional principle against governmental self-dealing only for 
the purpose of reevaluating the Klein rule of decision principle. 
Rule of decision doctrine and the self-dealing cases described 
above, together with Klein itself, suggest a reformulated Klein rule 
of decision principle that may be called the Klein Self-Dealing 
Principle.357 
                                                                                                     
 356. For example, a constitutional principle against self-dealing may inform 
the appropriate line between Article III judicial power and administrative agency 
adjudicatory authority, see generally Vermeule, Contra Nemo, supra note 200, at 
399, the scope of Emoluments Clause; Andy Grewal, The Foreign Emoluments 
Clause and the Chief Executive, 102 MINN. L. REV. 639 (2017), and judicial 
disqualification, see generally Amanda Frost, Keeping Up Appearances: A 
Process-Oriented Approach to Judicial Recusal, 53 KAN. L. REV. 531 (2005).  
 357. An issue closely related to the Klein rule of decision question is the extent 
to which Congress may interfere with final court judgments. The Court has held 
that Congress may not subject a federal court judgment to revision by the 
executive branch. See Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 410 (1792) (holding 
that “revision and control” of federal court judgments by the executive branch is 
inconsistent with judicial independence). Nor may Congress require a court to 
reopen a final judgment that is no longer subject to appeal. Compare Plaut v. 
Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S 211, 219 (1995) (holding that Congress may not 
require federal courts to reopen final judgments), with United States v. Schooner 
Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 110 (1801) (holding that a court must apply new 
law to case pending on appeal). However, the court must modify an ongoing 
injunction if required by a change in law. See Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & 
Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421, 431–32 (1855) (requiring court to 
modify ongoing injunction to conform with new law). Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 
327 (2000) blurred the line between ongoing injunctions and final judgments by 
upholding a statute that revised final judgments, but only temporarily, and for 
the purpose of facilitating other changes that were the main purpose of the law. 
See id. at 346 (holding that an automatic stay does not suspend a final judgment); 
GERANGELOS, JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 11, at 240 (describing Miller’s effect 
on a principle preventing Congress from requiring the courts to reopen final 
judgments). Miller stands in some tension with Klein to the extent that it allows 
significant congressional intrusion into judicial activity; but, because it addresses 
a somewhat different issue than Klein it does not stand in the way of an 
enforceable rule of decision principle. However, to the extent that the final 
judgment rule must be reconciled with the rule of decision principle, my tentative 
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First, the general rule: a court must apply the law in force at 
the time it decides a case,358 even to a case pending on appeal at 
the time of the change,359 and even if applying the change benefits 
the government.360 
Second, the Klein principle is an exception to this general rule. 
A court may not apply a statutory361 change in law that reflects 
governmental self-dealing. A statute reflects governmental 
self-dealing when it has the effect of benefitting the government as 
a party in a case that is pending.362 A statute benefits the 
                                                                                                     
view is that a principle against governmental self-dealing reconciles these two 
lines of cases. A Klein self-dealing principle distinguishes between a statute that 
affects the government’s obligations in a way that is “merely incidental to the 
accomplishment of a broader governmental objective,” from a statute that 
primarily affects an obligation of the government. Winstar, 518 U.S. at 897. The 
statute at issue in Miller did affect a case to which the government was 
(nominally) a party, but it also accomplished a broader governmental objective: it 
set new standards for the entry of injunctions in prison litigation cases. As a 
result, a Klein principle against self-dealing, if applied more broadly, also helps 
clarify the Court’s final judgment doctrine. See also United States v. Sioux 
Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 404–05 (1980) (holding that Congress may reopen final 
judgments in favor of the United States). 
 358. See Wheeling Bridge, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 431–32 (holding that the 
bridge was no longer a nuisance, despite previous decision declaring it a nuisance, 
because Congress intervened by passing a statute legalizing it). 
 359. See Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 110 (“But if subsequent to the 
judgment and before the decision of the appellate court, a law intervenes and 
positively changes the rule which governs, the law must be obeyed, or its 
obligation denied.”). 
 360. See Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc’y, 503 U.S. 429, 441 (1992) 
(upholding a statute conditionally ending litigation in favor of the United States). 
 361. Klein and other rule of decision cases involve the application of new 
statutory requirements. See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 147 
(1871) (considering effect of statutory change in law); Robertson, 503 U.S. at 441 
(same). There are different principles at stake when a court considers the 
retroactive application of a new judge-made rule or administrative regulation. See 
generally Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86 (1993) (considering 
retroactive application of judicial opinions); Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 
488 U.S. 204 (1988) (considering retroactive application of administrative 
regulations). As a result, the Klein principle articulated in this Article applies 
only to statutory changes in law. 
 362. See Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 147 (holding that Congress may not 
“prescribe a rule in conformity with which the court must deny to itself the 
jurisdiction thus conferred, because and only because its decision, in accordance 
with settled law, must be adverse to the government and favorable to the suitor”); 
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government as a party if it has the effect of abrogating an 
obligation owed by the government363 in a way that is not merely 
incidental to the accomplishment of a broader governmental 
objective.364 It is strong evidence that the change in law benefits 
the government as a party rather than accomplishing a broader 
governmental objective if the change necessarily will benefit the 
government365 or if a substantial part of the impact of the change 
in law is to relieve the government of its obligation.366 
Third, there are two corollaries to the general rule and Klein 
exception. Corollary A: if none or only an insubstantial part of the 
impact of a change in law inures to the benefit of the government, 
the court must apply the change in law.367 Corollary B: if the 
change in law abrogates an obligation of the government only 
incidental to the accomplishment of a broader governmental 
                                                                                                     
U.S. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 25–26 (1977) (“[C]omplete deference 
to a legislative assessment of reasonableness and necessity is not appropriate 
because the State’s self-interest is at stake.”); Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 
330, 350 (1935) (rejecting the argument that “Congress can disregard the 
obligations of the Government at its discretion”); United States v. Winstar Corp., 
518 U.S. 839, 896–98 (1996) (holding that the Government’s self-interest in a 
matter will affect the availability of the sovereign acts defense); Carmell v. Texas, 
529 U.S. 513, 546 (2000) (invalidating a retrospective statute because it will 
“necessarily run in the State’s favor”). 
 363. See United States Trust, 431 U.S. at 25–26 (declining to defer to a state’s 
repudiation of its own financial obligation); Perry, 294 U.S. at 350 (rejecting the 
argument that “Congress can disregard the obligations of the Government at its 
discretion”). 
 364. See Winstar, 518 U.S. at 896–98 (“[G]overnmental action will not be held 
against the Government for purposes of the impossibility defense so long as the 
action’s impact upon public contracts is . . . merely incidental to the 
accomplishment of a broader governmental objective.”). 
 365. See Carmell, 529 U.S. at 546 (stating that changes to the evidentiary 
rules that lower the quantum of evidence needed to convict always benefit the 
prosecution). 
 366. See Winstar, 518 U.S. at 896–98 (“[W]here a substantial part of the 
impact of the Government’s action rendering performance impossible falls on its 
own contractual obligations, the defense will be unavailable.”). 
 367. See United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 104–05 
(1801) (applying a change in law for the benefit of parties other than the 
government); United States v. Sioux Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 404–05 (1980) (same); 
Pope v. United States, 323 U.S. 1, 14 (1944) (same). 
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objective, or benefits someone other than the government, then it 
amends applicable law and must be applied by the court.368 
The implications of this newly reformulated Klein rule of 
decision principle, the Klein self-dealing principle, are explored in 
Part IV, below. 
IV. The Klein Self-Dealing Principle 
If Klein is a puzzle, as it often has been described,369 this 
Article has tried to fit its pieces together into an administrable 
constitutional principle that fits within an established 
constitutional tradition. As demonstrated above, the Court relies 
on a self-dealing rationale throughout its constitutional law 
doctrine, confirming that a principle against governmental 
self-dealing is a value of constitutional weight.370 Reading Klein in 
light of these cases allows us to view Klein not as an outlier or 
“derelict on the waters of the law,”371 but rather as a specific 
application of a deeply ingrained principle. This Part demonstrates 
the explanatory power of the Klein self-dealing principle by 
showing the extent to which it satisfies the constraints of both 
Klein itself and other rule of decision cases. Part V demonstrates 
how the Klein self-dealing principle provides a workable rule for 
lower courts to follow by applying it to a series of hypothetical 
cases.372 
                                                                                                     
 368. See Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1311 (2016) (applying a 
change in law that sets broad government policy); Robertson v. Seattle Aububon 
Soc’y, 503 U.S. 429, 441 (1992) (same). 
 369. See Sager, supra note 11, at 2525 (noting that Klein “is deeply puzzling”); 
see also Araiza, supra note 7119, at 1074 (“Klein is a puzzling case.”); Vermeule, 
supra note 28, at 423 (“The puzzle is that if Klein’s pronouncements are taken 
seriously, the decision can be made applicable to any statute at all.”); PFANDER, 
supra note 96, at 405 (stating that the Klein decision has “puzzled” scholars since 
it was decided). 
 370. See supra Part III.C (describing a principle against governmental self-
dealing. 
 371. Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 245 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., 
dissenting). 
 372. See infra Part V (applying principle against self-dealing to hypothetical 
cases). 
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A. The Klein Self-Dealing Principle Explains Klein Itself 
The principle against self-dealing formulated above explains 
the result in Klein, which appears to be the only case of its kind to 
have reached the Supreme Court. The Court of Claims correctly 
awarded Klein damages against the United States under the 
ACPA, as interpreted by Padelford, at the time the suit was 
brought.373 However, by the time this judgment was subject to 
review by the Supreme Court, Congress had changed the law 
through the appropriations proviso. Under the general rule stated 
above, the Court would have been bound to apply the proviso, 
resulting in a dismissal of Klein’s claim on appeal, unless the Klein 
self-dealing principle directed otherwise.374 
Most of the elements of the Klein self-dealing principle are 
satisfied by Klein without difficulty. The appropriations proviso 
benefitted the government in pending cases, including both Klein’s 
case and a number of other cases pending under the ACPA.375 It 
benefitted the government by abrogating an obligation owed by the 
government—the obligation to provide compensation for captured 
property set out by the ACPA.376 The key interpretive question is 
whether the proviso resulted in a benefit to the government as a 
party or whether, by contrast, the benefit was merely incidental to 
accomplishing a broader governmental objective.377 Under Klein’s 
facts, the difficulty may be described in the following way: even 
acknowledging that the proviso benefitted the government in 
Klein’s pending case, was this benefit merely incidental to the 
accomplishment of a broader governmental objective? On its face, 
the purpose of the appropriations proviso was to deny 
compensation to formerly disloyal southerners. Whether or not 
this was a good result, can it not be described as a policy or, in the 
                                                                                                     
 373. See United States v. Padelford, 76 U.S. 531, 533 (1869) (broadly 
interpreting the ACPA to include claims like those in Klein). 
 374. See Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 110 (applying change in law to 
pending case). 
 375. See Klein, 80 U.S. at 146 (noting that statute relieved the government of 
its obligations in a pending case). 
 376. See id. at 138–39 (describing the government’s obligations under the 
ACPA). 
 377. See supra Part III.D (describing the rule against governmental self-
dealing). 
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language of the Klein self-dealing principle, a “governmental 
objective?”  
Irrespective of Congress’s purposes in enacting the proviso, 
the proviso did not establish a broader governmental policy within 
the meaning of the Klein self-dealing principle formulated above. 
Under this principle, a change in law benefits the government as 
a party in a way that is not incidental to a broader governmental 
objective when the law necessarily will benefit the government378 
or if a substantial part of the impact of the change is to relieve the 
government of an obligation.379 As its application to Klein 
demonstrates, the Klein self-dealing principle distinguishes 
between an even-handed rule—one that sometimes benefits the 
government and sometimes benefits other parties—from a rule 
that always benefits the government. It also distinguishes between 
a rule with a public objective—one in which the change of law 
benefits the government but also does other things—from a rule 
that relieves the government of an obligation but does nothing or 
little else. Under Klein’s facts, the appropriations proviso was not 
even-handed because it provided a rule that would always benefit 
the government in all its applications.380 Indeed, the sole effect of 
the proviso was to relieve the government of obligations 
identifiable at the time the proviso was enacted.381 Moreover, 
whatever the motivations of Congress for doing so, the effect of the 
proviso was only to relieve the government of its obligations under 
the ACPA, not to set public policy.382 As a result, under the Klein 
self-dealing principle, the appropriations proviso benefitted the 
government as a party in a pending case. It was, therefore, 
self-dealing within the meaning of the Klein self-dealing principle. 
Because the appropriations proviso was self-dealing, the Court 
correctly declined to apply it to the facts of Klein. 
                                                                                                     
 378. See Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 546 (2000) (invalidating change in 
law that necessarily benefitted the government in a pending case). 
 379. See Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 146 (invalidating change in law that 
relieved the government of its obligations in a pending case); United States v. 
Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 896–98 (1996) (same); Carmell, 529 U.S. at 546 
(same). 
 380. See Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 147 (invalidating statute that would 
necessarily benefit the government).  
 381. See id. at 148 (describing the effect of the proviso). 
 382. See id. (describing the effect of proviso). 
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B. The Klein Self-Dealing Principle Easily Explains Most Rule of 
Decision Cases 
A principle against governmental self-dealing is not, to be 
sure, the only possible reading of Klein. But, unlike its many other 
potential meanings,383 reading Klein to state a principle against 
governmental self-dealing largely explains pre- and post-Klein 
cases that consider the bounds of Congress’s power to direct 
decisions in particular cases. 
The broadest articulations of Klein suggest that it should be 
read to prevent the government from picking winners and losers 
in particular cases.384 This potential Klein principle, although 
jurisprudentially attractive,385 has proved inconsistent with every 
rule of decision case except Klein itself.386 By contrast, reading 
Klein as limited to disfavoring governmental self-dealing explains 
hard-to-distinguish cases that have made doctrinal analysis of 
Klein so challenging. The Klein self-dealing principle is an 
exception to the general rule that the court must apply a change in 
law to pending cases, even cases pending on appeal.387 The Klein 
self-dealing principle is an exception to this general rule, but only 
for cases that demonstrate self-dealing on the part of the 
government.388 In order for a statute to reflect self-dealing on the 
part of the government, it must have the effect of benefitting the 
government as a party in a case that is pending.389 As a result, a 
                                                                                                     
 383. See supra Part II (describing possible meanings of Klein). 
 384. See Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1336 (2016) (Roberts, 
C.J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court for permitting Congress to “unabashedly 
pick the winners and losers in particular pending cases”).  
 385. See supra Part II.C (describing possible meanings of Klein; see also 
Zoldan, Bank Markazi, supra note 144, at 8–9 (arguing that Bank Markazi 
incorrectly rejected a value of legislative generality). 
 386. See Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 
421, 435–36 (1855) (applying new law to benefit a party in a pending case); Bank 
Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1324–25 (same). 
 387. See United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 110 (1801) 
(applying a change in law to a pending case); Wheeling Bridge, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 
at 435–36 (same). 
 388. See supra Part III (describing a self-dealing justification for Klein).  
 389. See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 147 (1871) 
(invalidating the statute that benefitted the government as a party in a pending 
case); U.S. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 25–26 (1977) (same); United 
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Klein self-dealing principle easily explains cases like Wheeling 
Bridge and Bank Markazi, neither of which involved the 
government as a party.390 Both of these opinions upheld statutes 
in which the government picked a winner in a particular case;391 
however, in neither case was the government a party to the 
dispute. As a result, neither implicates the Klein self-dealing 
principle. In the language of Corollary A, because the benefit of the 
changes in law in these cases inured to a party other than the 
government, the Court properly applied the change in law. 
For this same reason, the Klein self-dealing principle also 
explains cases in which the government is a party to an ongoing 
dispute, but Congress’s intervening statute favors a party other 
than the government. In Schooner Peggy, the American vessel 
Trumbull captured the Schooner Peggy, which was brought to port 
for condemnation.392 The court of appeals found that the Schooner 
Peggy was an “armed vessel,” rendering the Peggy and its cargo 
lawful prize.393 Accordingly, the court decreed that the proceeds of 
the sale of the Peggy and its cargo should be divided between the 
United States and the crew of the Trumbull.394 The Supreme Court 
reversed, holding that a treaty entered into between the United 
States and France, after the lower court’s opinion was rendered, 
required the return of the vessel to France.395 Unlike Klein’s 
appropriations proviso, the treaty had the effect of benefitting a 
party to a pending case, but a party other than the government—
in this case the Peggy’s French owners. As a result, the Court 
correctly applied the change in law under the Klein self-dealing 
principle. 
                                                                                                     
States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 896–98 (1996) (same); Perry v. United 
States, 294 U.S. 330, 347 (1935) (same); Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 546 
(2000) (same). 
 390. See Wheeling Bridge, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 435–36 (applying a change in 
law to benefit a party other than the government); Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 
1324–25 (same); Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 228 (1995) (same).  
 391. See Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1336 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (noting 
that statute picked winner in pending case); Plaut, 514 U.S. at 228 (noting that 
reducing favoritism is not the purpose of separation of powers). 
 392. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 108. 
 393. Id. at 106. 
 394. Id. at 107. 
 395. Id. at 108–109. 
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Although Schooner Peggy did not expressly emphasize the 
relevance of which party benefitted from the change in law, this 
factor was central to the Court’s later opinions in Pope v. United 
States396 and Sioux Nation, both of which emphasize the 
significance of whether a change in law benefits the government 
as litigating party.397 In Pope, a government contractor failed to 
prevail in a claim for government funds in the Court of Claims.398 
In response, Congress directed the Court of Claims to render 
judgment in favor of the claimant.399 The Court distinguished this 
case from Klein, noting that the special act, unlike Klein’s 
appropriations proviso, created a new right enforceable against the 
United States.400 Although the Court did not reach the question, it 
doubted whether Klein prevented Congress from “set[ting] aside a 
judgment of the Court of Claims in favor of the Government.”401  
The question left open in Pope was answered a few decades 
later in Sioux Nation. Sioux Nation arose out of a federal statute 
that abrogated a treaty between the United States and the Sioux, 
guaranteeing the latter undisturbed use of the Black Hills of South 
Dakota.402 The Sioux claimed that the federal statute was a Fifth 
Amendment taking but failed to prevail in their suit for 
damages.403 Later, Congress created a general mechanism for 
Indian tribes to bring claims against the government arising under 
treaty.404 When the Sioux again brought a claim arising from the 
loss of the Black Hills, this time pursuant to the new statute, the 
court held that the claim was barred, because of res judicata, by 
the previous Black Hills suit.405 In response, Congress enacted still 
another statute, this time authorizing the court to hear the Sioux’s 
                                                                                                     
 396. 323 U.S. 1 (1944). 
 397. See id. at 8–9 (holding that Klein does not apply when Congress changes 
the law to set aside judgment in favor of the government). 
 398. Id. at 5–6.  
 399. Id. at 6. 
 400. See id. at 9 (noting that the Act’s purpose was to create a new obligation 
on the part of the Government). 
 401. Id. at 8–9 (emphasis added). 
 402. United States v. Sioux Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 374 (1980).  
 403. Id. at 384. 
 404. See id. at 384–85 (describing the Indian Claims Commission Act). 
 405. Id. at 387. 
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Black Hills claim “without regard to the defense of res judicata and 
collateral estoppel.”406 Freed from the restraints of preclusion, the 
lower court awarded the Sioux compensation for the value of the 
Black Hills.407 Reviewing this award, the Supreme Court 
considered whether the statute reopening the Sioux’s claims for 
judicial consideration had “passed the limit which separates the 
legislative from the judicial power,” thereby violating Klein’s rule 
of decision principle.408 The Court held that it did not.409 The Court 
specifically distinguished Klein by emphasizing that Klein’s 
appropriations proviso “required the courts to decide a controversy 
in the Government’s favor.”410 This distinction is relevant, the 
Court said, because it was of “obvious importance to the Klein 
holding” that “Congress was attempting to decide the controversy 
in its own favor.”411 
Viewed through the lens of a Klein self-dealing principle, 
Sioux Nation and Pope are easily explained. Unlike Klein, in which 
the Court repudiated a change of law that benefited the 
government as litigating party, Sioux Nation and Pope applied 
changes in law that inured to the benefit of a party litigating 
against the government.412 In the language of Corollary A, because 
the change in law in these cases inured to the benefit of a party 
other than the government, the court properly applied the change 
in law.413 
                                                                                                     
 406. Id. at 391. 
 407. Id. at 389–90. 
 408. See id. at 391 (considering the application of Klein to a statute that 
benefits someone other than the government (citing United States v. Klein, 80 
U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 147 (1871))). 
 409. Id. at 404–05. 
 410. Id. at 404–05. 
 411. Id. at 405. 
 412. Id. at 405 (upholding statute that reopened claim against the 
government); Pope, 323 U.S. at 8-9 (same). 
 413. See supra Part III.D (describing principle against governmental 
self-dealing). Moreover, Sioux Nation and Pope affirm that Klein’s language 
focusing on whether the change in law benefitted the government is not an 
idiosyncrasy of the Klein opinion.  
THE KLEIN RULE OF DECISION PUZZLE 2201 
C. The Klein Self-Dealing Principle and the Limits of Doctrine 
The Klein self-dealing principle described above explains 
Klein, situates it within a strong constitutional tradition 
disfavoring self-dealing, and easily explains many of the rule of 
decision cases that are thought to stand in tension with Klein. But, 
other cases, even under the self-dealing principle, are difficult to 
square with Klein. In particular, Robertson and Eslin each describe 
factual situations that are similar to Klein in relevant ways.414 As 
described below, the self-dealing principle goes a long way toward 
explaining Robertson and Eslin, even if, ultimately, it is not 
possible to reconcile them entirely with Klein.415 Nevertheless, 
rereading Robertson and Eslin in light of the Klein self-dealing 
principle elucidates two important implications of the principle. 
Specifically, the Klein self-dealing principle gives new meaning to 
the Changed Law Rule relied on by Robertson and the principle 
invoked by Eslin that Congress pays claims only as a matter of 
grace. 
1. Robertson and the Changed Law Rule 
The difficult Robertson decision has long been considered a 
significant challenge to the articulation of a viable Klein principle. 
By inverting the relationship between Klein’s rule of decision 
principle and the Changed Law Rule, Robertson can be read to 
mean that any statutory change prevents the application of Klein. 
If it is true, as scholars and Chief Justice Roberts have argued,416 
that Congress changes the law within the meaning of Klein 
whenever it acts, then Robertson bars the application of Klein in 
the only situations in which it might apply, to wit, when Congress 
changes the law. But this is not the only way to read Robertson. 
Viewing Robertson through the lens of self-dealing reveals a 
principled standard for determining when an Act of Congress 
                                                                                                     
 414. See infra Parts IV.C.1–2 (describing Eslin and Robertson). 
 415. Id. 
 416. See Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1335 (2016) (Roberts, 
C.J., dissenting) (describing the narrow space between Robertson and Klein); see 
also Araiza, supra note 7118, at 1079 (same). 
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“changes applicable law” within the meaning of Klein that still 
leaves some space for the operation of a Klein principle. 
a. The Northwest Timber Compromise 
Robertson arose out of the management of federally owned 
forests in Oregon.417 The United States Bureau of Land 
Management (BLM) and the state of Oregon entered into an 
agreement for the dual purposes of protecting spotted owls living 
in the forests of Oregon and also permitting logging in those 
forests.418 Conservation and logging groups brought suits to 
challenge the designation of logging and protected areas.419 While 
litigation was pending, Congress intervened; in a statute widely 
known as the Northwest Timber Compromise, Congress required 
the BLM to offer for sale a certain amount of timber during the 
following year420 but also prohibited logging in particular areas. 
Specifically, § (b)(3) prohibited harvesting in areas previously 
designated as no-harvest areas by BLM.421 Section (b)(5) 
prohibited harvesting in areas identified as no-harvest areas in the 
agreement between BLM and the State of Oregon.422 Finally, as a 
way to enforce the Compromise, Congress provided a conditional 
mechanism for terminating the ongoing litigation over the proper 
amount of timber harvesting.423 In § (b)(6), Congress provided that 
“management of areas according to subsections (b)(3) and (b)(5) of 
this section . . . is adequate consideration for the purpose of 
meeting the statutory requirements that are the basis” for three 
                                                                                                     
 417. Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc’y, 503 U.S. 429, 432–33 (1992). 
 418. Portland Audubon Soc’y v. Lujan, 712 F. Supp. 1456, 1460 (D. Or. 1989). 
 419. Robertson, 503 U.S. at 432. 
 420. Id. at 433; see Department of the Interior and Related Agencies 
Appropriations Act, 101 Pub. L. No. 121, § 318(a), 103 Stat. 701, 745–50 (1990) 
(providing for compromise between logging and preservation interests). 
 421. § 318(b)(3), 103 Stat. at 746. 
 422. See § 318(b)(5), 103 Stat. at 746–47 (providing for compromise between 
logging and preservation interests). 
 423. See § 318(b)(6), 103 Stat. at 747–48 (providing for conditional dismissal 
of cases against the government). 
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particular, pending cases challenging BLM’s logging and 
preservation decisions.424  
Put simply, if BLM sold timber and preserved forestland in 
accordance with the provisions of §§ (b)(3) and (b)(5), it would be 
deemed to have satisfied the statutory requirements that served 
as the bases for suits pending against BLM. The effect of (b)(6), 
therefore, was to require courts to dismiss the litigation 
challenging BLM’s timber management decisions, provided that 
BLM followed the conditions set out in the statute.425 The Court 
upheld the Compromise against a Klein challenge.426 Finding that 
the statute amended applicable law, the Court held that Klein’s 
restrictions did not take hold.427 
b. The Broader Governmental Objective Analysis 
Robertson is often characterized as presenting an 
insurmountable challenge to the continuing viability of an 
enforceable Klein rule of decision principle.428 Indeed, by naming 
particular cases, the Compromise appears to direct the outcome in 
pending cases even more pointedly than Klein’s appropriations 
proviso itself. Although Robertson is a close case, the Klein 
self-dealing principle suggests how it might be distinguished from 
Klein. Under this principle, the Compromise would be prohibited 
as self-dealing only if it had the effect of abrogating an obligation 
owed by the government in a way that was not merely incidental 
to the accomplishment of a broader governmental objective. It 
would be strong evidence that the Compromise benefitted the 
government as a party rather than accomplishing a broader 
governmental objective if it necessarily benefitted the government 
or if a substantial part of the impact of the Compromise was to 
relieve the government of an obligation.429 
                                                                                                     
 424. § 318(b)(6)(A), 103 Stat. at 747. 
 425. See Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc’y, 503 U.S. 429, 434–36 (1992) 
(describing the effect of the Compromise). 
 426. See id. at 441 (upholding the Compromise). 
 427. See id. (finding that the Compromise “did amend applicable law”). 
 428. See Vermeule, supra note 28, at 424 (describing tension between 
Robertson and Klein); Araiza, supra note 7119, at 1079 (same). 
 429. Supra Part III.D; see also Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 546 (2000) 
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First, the Compromise did not necessarily benefit the 
government. The key difference between the proviso and the 
Compromise is the fact that the Compromise did not automatically 
terminate the pending litigation against BLM; rather, it 
conditioned the termination of the litigation on the BLM’s 
satisfaction of the conditions in (b)(3) and (b)(5).430 As a result, 
although the Compromise resulted in a benefit to the government 
in the particular cases that were described in it, the benefit was 
contingent. The Compromise did not provide a rule of decision that 
necessarily inured to the benefit of the government,431 either in 
those cases or in future cases. Section (b)(6) required the dismissal 
of the suits it referenced only if the government abided by the 
conditions in (b)(3) and (b)(5).432 Those conditions were not 
foregone conclusions: the government was required by (b)(3) and 
(b)(5) both to refrain from permitting logging in areas in which 
BLM previously had prohibited it and to adhere to its agreement 
with Oregon.433 In order to receive the benefit of the Compromise, 
therefore, the government was required to modify its future 
conduct. If the government had failed to meet either of these 
conditions, the Compromise would not have determined the result 
in the lawsuits referenced in the Compromise. Contrast this with 
Klein. In Klein, the dismissal of cases under the proviso was not 
conditioned on any future act of the government.434 Rather, there 
was nothing that the government had to do—or refrain from 
doing—to win every case within the ambit of the proviso. The 
                                                                                                     
(upholding a change in law as evenhanded when it does not “necessarily run in 
the State’s favor”). 
 430. See Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 
101 Pub. L. No. 121, § 318(b)(6)(A), 103 Stat. 701, 747 (1990) (describing 
conditional termination of litigation). 
 431. Cf. Carmell, 529 U.S. at 546 (invalidating statute that necessarily 
benefitted the government in a pending case). 
 432. See § 318(b)(6)(A), 103 Stat. at 747 (describing conditional termination 
of litigation). 
 433. See § 318(b)(5), 103 Stat. at 746–47 (describing conditions precedent to 
termination of litigation); Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc’y, 503 U.S. 429, 433–
35 (1992) (same). 
 434. See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 129 (1871) (noting that 
the proviso “deemed . . . conclusive evidence that such person did take part in and 
give aid and comfort to the late rebellion” (citing Abandoned and Captured 
Property Act of 1863, ch. 120, § 1, 12 Stat. 820)). 
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proviso’s benefit for the government was therefore a foregone 
conclusion and the application of the proviso necessarily benefitted 
the government. 
Second, although it a close case, a substantial part of the 
impact of the Compromise was not to relieve the government of an 
obligation. This is the most analytically uncertain part of 
Robertson. Certainly, some part of the impact of the Compromise 
relieved the government of an obligation; at the least, it was 
relieved of its obligation to litigate the cases referenced in the 
Compromise.435 Further, to the extent that the obligations of (b)(3) 
and (b)(5) were less onerous than the statutory obligations 
provided by generally applicable environmental statutes, the 
government was relieved of those burdens as well. But the 
Compromise did considerably more than lighten the government’s 
burdens. It was, truly, a compromise, balancing competing policies 
of environmental conservation and natural resource exploitation. 
As members of Congress described at the time, the Compromise 
struck a balance between the preferences of environmentalists and 
the timber community.436 In the Court’s words, it “established a 
comprehensive set of rules to govern harvesting” in thirteen 
national forests, albeit for a limited time.437  Seen in this light, the 
government primarily stood to benefit from the Compromise in the 
sense that it always benefits from successfully reaching agreement 
among different interest groups over competing public goals. 
Congress agreed to the Compromise precisely because interested 
members of the public—including both environmentalists and the 
logging industry—wanted to compromise.438  
Moreover, because dismissal of the pending cases was 
conditional, the Compromise forced the government to adhere to 
the terms of the Compromise or risk returning to court to defend 
                                                                                                     
 435. See § 318(b)(6)(A), 103 Stat. at 746–47 (identifying cases to be 
terminated). 
 436. See Associated Press, Compromise Reached on Spotted Owl, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 29, 1989), http://www.nytimes.com/1989/09/30/us/compromise-reached-on-
spotted-owl.html?mcubz=3 (last visited Dec. 6, 2017) (describing the legislative 
compromise to protect the spotted owl and allow logging in the Pacific Northwest) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 437. Robertson, 503 U.S. at 433. 
 438. See Associated Press, supra note 436 (describing policy issues at stake in 
Compromise). 
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its decision to depart from it.439 This is unlike Klein’s proviso.440 
The proviso had the effect of voiding the government’s obligations 
under the ACPA, forcing Klein and others like him to bear the costs 
of the government’s decision.441 By contrast, rather than shifting 
public costs to private parties, the Compromise forced the 
government to continue to bear the costs associated with the deal 
struck over timber and the spotted owl.442 Because of the widely 
distributed benefits of the Compromise, relief of the government’s 
obligation was not a substantial part of the Compromise within the 
meaning of the Klein self-dealing principle. The implications of the 
“substantial part” analysis are explored in the next section, which 
applies the self-dealing principle to hypothetical future cases.443 
c. The Changed Law Rule Reconsidered 
The broader governmental objective analysis, which 
distinguishes Robertson from Klein, also helps explain why the 
Changed Law Rule can coexist with Klein. Robertson held that 
Klein did not apply because the Compromise “amend[ed] 
applicable law.”444 A broad rendering of the concept of amending 
applicable law would swallow the Klein rule altogether, as Chief 
Justice Roberts opined in Bank Markazi445 and as commentators 
have argued.446 But, the broader governmental objective analysis 
that distinguishes between Klein and Robertson suggests that not 
                                                                                                     
 439. See Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 
101 Pub. L. No. 121, § 318(b)(6)(A), 103 Stat. 701, 749 (1990) (providing 
mechanism for challenging the government’s implementation of the 
Compromise). 
 440. See Klein, 80 U.S. at 146 (describing proviso’s effect on government 
obligations). 
 441. See id. (describing the proviso’s effect on government obligations). 
 442. See § 318(b)(6)(A), 103 Stat. at 749 (providing mechanism for challenging 
the government’s implementation of the Compromise). 
 443. Infra Part III.D.  
 444. Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc’y, 503 U.S. 429, 441 (1992). 
 445. See Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1335 (2016) (Roberts, 
C.J., dissenting) (opining that a broad reading of the changed law rule swallows 
the Klein principle).  
 446. See Araiza, supra note 72, at 1079 (suggesting that the space between 
lawmaking and amending law may be non-existent). 
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every statutory amendment “amends applicable law” within the 
meaning of Klein. Rather, a change in law “amends applicable law” 
only if it sets policy. In other words, as long as the benefit to the 
government of a change in law is merely incidental to the 
accomplishment of a broader governmental objective (as in 
Robertson), a change in law amends applicable law within the 
meaning of Klein. By contrast, if a substantial part of the effect of 
the change is merely to relieve the government of an obligation (as 
in Winstar or Klein), the change in law does not amend applicable 
law and does not meet the requirements of the Changed Law Rule. 
In the language of Corollary B, even though the Compromise 
abrogated an obligation of the government, it also amended 
applicable law because it accomplished a broader governmental 
objective. Because the Compromise amended applicable law, it was 
properly applied by the Court. 
2. Eslin and Congress’s Grace 
Eslin presents the greatest doctrinal challenge to the 
formulation of a Klein principle consistent with rule of decision 
cases.447 In Eslin, Congress enacted an appropriations bill that 
repealed a previous grant of jurisdiction to the Court of Claims to 
hear suits making claims on government funds.448 The 
appropriations bill vacated proceedings pending before the Court 
of Claims, including a judgment for Eslin, which was pending on 
appeal.449 Despite its striking similarity to Klein, the Court upheld 
the appropriations bill,450 placing Eslin and Klein in significant 
tension. The Klein self-dealing principle provides a framework that 
brings into focus the difference between these cases, even if it is 
ultimately impossible to reconcile them.451 Although it did benefit 
the Treasury, Eslin’s appropriations proviso can be considered 
something other than governmental self-dealing because the 
                                                                                                     
 447. See Jackson, supra note 11, at 585–86 (noting the tension between Eslin 
and Klein); Eisenberg, supra note 180, at 526 (same). 
 448. See generally District of Columbia v. Eslin, 183 U.S. 62 (1901). 
 449. Id. at 63–64. 
 450. Id. at 66. 
 451. See supra Part III.D (formulating a principle against governmental 
self-dealing). 
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obligation to pay Eslin’s claims was not an obligation of the United 
States.452 Moreover, the fine distinction between Eslin and Klein 
reveals an important insight about the key phrase in Klein 
rejecting the argument that Congress’s payment of funds is always 
a matter of grace.453 In order to understand the distinction between 
Eslin and Klein, and to understand what it means for Congress to 
have an obligation to allocate federal funds, it is necessary to know 
a bit about the intertwined histories of the two main characters in 
the Eslin case: the District of Columbia and the Court of Claims. 
a. The District of Columbia 
The District of Columbia is a federal district authorized by the 
Constitution454 and created by a joint agreement among the United 
States, Virginia, and Maryland.455 From its inception in 1790, the 
District possessed a character distinct from the federal 
government.456 At the time it was created, it was composed of five 
distinct geographic areas with different municipal structures.457 
After the District’s creation, the areas of the District that were 
formerly part of Maryland continued to be governed by Maryland 
law; so, too, were the portions of the District formerly part of 
Virginia governed by Virginia law.458 These distinct municipal 
areas were abolished in 1871, when the District was granted a 
single government empowered, for the first time, to make its own 
laws, appoint its own officers, and govern its own internal 
affairs.459 The central organ of the new government was the 
                                                                                                     
 452. See infra Part IV.C.2.d (describing the distinction between government 
obligations and acts of grace). 
 453. See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 144 (1871) (explaining 
that it is “not entirely accurate” to say that the right to sue the government in the 
Court of Claims is a “matter of favor”). 
 454. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (granting Congress the authority over federal 
district). 
 455. Zoldan, Permanent Seat, supra note 322, at 173–77. 
 456. See WALTER FARLEIGH DODD, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF 
COLUMBIA 27 (1909) (describing that distinct municipal areas of the District 
continued to be governed by state law). 
 457. Zoldan, Permanent Seat, supra note 322, at 173–77. 
 458. DODD, supra note 456, at 27. 
 459. Id. at 42; Gregory E. Mize, A Guide to Deciphering the Laws of a Unique 
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powerful Board of Public Works (Board), a committee of five 
appointees charged with overseeing the repair and maintenance of 
the District’s streets, sewer system, and all other public works 
projects.460 
In what would become the undoing of the District’s 
government, the Board was also permitted to enter into contracts 
on behalf of the District for the completion of the projects it 
oversaw.461 Almost immediately after its creation, the Board ran 
over budget and was accused of financial mismanagement.462 A 
series of congressional investigations followed, instigated by the 
belief that the Board was wasteful and given over to cronyism.463 
Whether the Board was corrupt is unclear;464 what is clear is that 
the Board ran the District deep into debt.465 In three short years, 
the Board bankrupted the District and precipitated its end as an 
autonomous political entity.466 In 1874, after completing a third 
investigation of the District in four years, Congress abolished the 
District’s government, eliminating its legislative assembly, 
governor, and, most relevantly, the Board.467  
                                                                                                     
City-State Legislature—The Council of the District of Columbia, 2 POTOMAC L. 
REV. 1, 7 (1979). 
 460. DODD, supra note 456, at 42–43; E.E. Naylor, The District of Columbia, 
Its Legal Status, 21 GEO. L.J. 21, 26 (1932). 
 461. DODD, supra note 456, at 43; Naylor, supra note 460, at 26–27. 
 462. See DODD, supra note 456, at 45 (discussing allegations of the Board’s 
“extravagance, violation of law, and corruption”).  
 463. See id. at 43–46 (describing allegations against Board); D.C. BD. OF 
COMM’RS, REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA FOR THE 
YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 1896, at 49 (1896) [hereinafter 1896 D.C. COMMISSIONERS 
REPORT] (noting that the Board promised rates above contract rates and awarded 
no-bid contracts). 
 464. See DODD, supra note 456, at 50 (noting that the congressional 
investigation did not confirm illegal activity); Naylor, supra note 460, at 28 
(explaining that Board’s members were ultimately cleared of wrongdoing). 
 465. See DODD, supra note 456, at 46 (describing debt incurred by the Board); 
Mize, supra note 459, at 7 (same). 
 466. See DODD, supra note 456, at 49 (describing bankruptcy of District’s 
government). 
 467. See Act of June 20, 1874, ch. 337, § 1, 18 Stat. 116 (abolishing the 
government of the District); DODD, supra note 456, at 49 (describing abolition of 
the District’s government); Mize, supra note 459, at 7 (same). 
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The claims at issue in Eslin arose from contracts made during 
the Board’s short, unhappy existence. Eslin was the administrator 
of the estate of Daniel Connolly, who had been contracted by the 
Board to make improvements to the streets of Washington.468 The 
claims that were the basis of Connolly’s suit were obligated 
between 1871 and 1874 by the Board.469 When the District’s 
government was abolished, its debts to contractors like Connolly 
went unpaid.470 In response to the perception of the Board’s 
profligacy and corruption, Congress—now solely in charge of the 
District’s debts—made no provision for paying the District’s 
outstanding contract debts.471 
b. The Court of Claims 
In 1863, Congress gave the Court of Claims the power to issue 
final judgments472 against the United States for money 
damages.473 But, at the time the District became bankrupt and its 
government was abolished, the Court of Claims had no authority 
to hear claims against the District.474 It was not for six years after 
the abolition of the District’s government that Congress agreed to 
assume its debts. In 1880, Congress expanded the jurisdiction of 
the Court of Claims to include “jurisdiction of all claims now 
existing against the District of Columbia arising out of contracts, 
made by the late Board of Public Works.”475  
                                                                                                     
 468. Eslin v. District of Columbia, 22 Ct. Cl. 395, 399 (1887). 
 469. Id. 
 470. See DODD, supra note 456, at 50 (describing outstanding contracts of the 
District after abolition of its government). 
 471. Id. 
 472. See Evan C. Zoldan, The King is Dead, Long Live the King!: Sovereign 
Immunity and the Curious Case of Nonappropriated Fund Instrumentalities, 38 
CONN. L. REV. 455, 493–95 (2006) (describing the origin of the authority of the 
Court of Claims to render final judgments). 
 473. See Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 92, § 2, 12 Stat. 765 (establishing a court to 
render final judgments on claims against the United States). 
 474. See id. (setting out jurisdiction of Court of Claims). 
 475. Act of June 16, 1880, ch. 243, § 1, 21 Stat. 284; see also In re District of 
Columbia, 180 U.S. 250, 251–52 (1901) (describing jurisdiction over claims arising 
out of Board obligations). 
THE KLEIN RULE OF DECISION PUZZLE 2211 
c. Eslin in the Court of Claims 
It was under this 1880 jurisdictional statute that the claims in 
Eslin were brought before the Court of Claims.476 The claimant 
sought the “Board Rate” rather than the “contract rate” for the 
work that was completed on behalf of the District.477 The contract 
rate was the rate specified by the actual written terms of 
Connolly’s contracts with the Board.478 The Board Rate was an 
amount later determined by the Board to be a fair amount for 
particular types of work.479 The Court of Claims held that the 
District was liable to Eslin for the lower contract rate rather than 
the Board Rate.480 
That would have been the end of Eslin’s claims but for an 1895 
federal statute reviving them. At the urging of contractors 
disappointed at receiving only the lower contract rates, Congress 
amended the 1880 jurisdictional statute to require the Court of 
Claims to grant new trials for all claims brought under the 1880 
statute.481 In addition, the Court of Claims was required to award 
judgment based on the higher Board Rate.482 As was recognized at 
the time, the 1895 statute created a windfall for contractors, like 
Connolly, who had already been paid for their work.483 Under the 
1895 law, Eslin, whose claims had been paid at their contract rate, 
again brought suit, this time for the Board Rate associated with 
                                                                                                     
 476. See District of Columbia v. Eslin, 183 U.S. 62, 62–63 (1901) (describing 
claims in Eslin). 
 477. 1896 D.C. COMMISSIONERS REPORT, supra note 463, at 49. 
 478. Eslin v. District of Columbia, 22 Ct. Cl. 395, 399 (1887). 
 479. Id. at 399–400; see also Franklin T. Howe, The Board of Public Works, 3 
RECS. COLUM. HIST. SOC’Y 257, 264 (1900) (describing the Board Rate). 
 480. Eslin, 22 Ct. Cl. at 399–400. 
 481. 1896 D.C. COMMISSIONERS REPORT, supra note 463, at 49–50 (describing 
the impetus behind the 1880 amendment). 
 482. See Act of Feb. 13, 1895, ch. 87, 28 Stat. 664 (amending the 1880 Act 
providing for the settlement of outstanding claims); see also 1896 D.C. 
COMMISSIONERS REPORT, supra note 463, at 49 (describing the impetus behind the 
1880 amendment). 
 483. See 1896 D.C. COMMISSIONERS REPORT, supra note 463, at 49–50 (noting 
that some contractors had persuaded the Board to award contracts based on the 
representation that they could be performed at a rate lower than Board Rate, only 
to bring suit for the higher rate after the 1895 Act). 
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Connolly’s work.484 Pursuant to this new measure of damages, 
Eslin received judgment for $13,000.485 
The final scene in this drama took place in 1897. Regretting 
the decision to reopen the claims against the District settled in 
1880, Congress reclosed the reopened claims, providing that the 
1895 act is “repealed, and all proceedings pending shall be vacated, 
and no judgment heretofore rendered in pursuance of said act shall 
be paid.”486 Because Eslin’s claims were among those reopened by 
the 1895 act, the 1897 act had the effect of vacating the trial court’s 
judgment for Eslin.487 On appeal, the Supreme Court considered 
the effect of the 1897 act on the power of the Court to reexamine 
the Court of Claims’s judgments. The Court upheld the 1897 act, 
holding that it “was an act of grace upon the part of the United 
States to provide for the payment by the Secretary of the Treasury 
of the amount of any final judgment” in favor of Eslin.488 As a 
result, the Court held, Congress’s decision to withdraw its grace 
also must be given effect by the Court.489 The Court did just that, 
ordering Eslin’s appeal dismissed and leaving him without 
payment under the 1895 statute.490 
d. Fulfilling an Obligation or an Act of Grace? 
What light does this history shed on the viability of Klein? 
Unlike Robertson’s Compromise, Eslin’s 1897 act appears to have 
withdrawn jurisdiction over pending claims without any broader 
governmental objective. As a result, if Eslin can be distinguished 
from Klein, it is because the 1897 act did not abrogate an obligation 
owed by the United States government within the meaning of the 
Klein self-dealing principle. This conclusion is supported by the 
                                                                                                     
 484. See District of Columbia v. Eslin, 183 U.S. 62, 63 (1901) (recounting the 
procedural history of Eslin’s claims). 
 485. Id. 
 486. See Act of Mar. 3, 1897, ch. 387, 29 Stat. 669; accord Eslin, 183 U.S. at 
64 (describing the withdrawal of jurisdiction for claims reopened in 1895). 
 487. See Eslin, 183 U.S. at 64–65 (describing the effect of the 1897 withdrawal 
of jurisdiction). 
 488. Id. at 65. 
 489. Id. 
 490. Id. at 65–66. 
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legal differences between the District and the United States. When 
the District became indebted for the work that was the subject of 
Eslin’s claims, the District was, for relevant purposes, not the 
United States government. It had a different source of lawmaking 
authority than federal agencies or federal territories. Its law was 
not federal law and its courts did not bind the federal government. 
The District had its own budget, authority to contract, and court 
system for resolving disputes against it.491 Although Congress had 
provided a forum for claims against the United States, this forum, 
the Court of Claims, could not be used for claims against the 
District.492 Indeed, if Connolly had sued the District in 1874 in the 
Court of Claims for breach of contract, the Court would have been 
required to dismiss the claims for lack of jurisdiction. This 
difference is reflected even in Eslin’s caption: unlike claims against 
the United States for money damages, Eslin’s suit was one against 
the District of Columbia.493 
All of this suggests that the District was not, at the time it 
became obligated to Connolly, the United States; and the District’s 
obligations to Connolly, therefore, were not obligations of the 
United States. Because the United States had no preexisting legal 
or financial duty to assume the District’s debts, Congress’s 1880 
decision to expand the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims to include 
the District’s debts conferred a gratuity on the District’s claimants 
and did not create for itself an obligation. On this reading, the 
Court correctly applied Eslin’s change in law because it inured to 
                                                                                                     
 491. See Act of Feb. 21, 1871, ch. 62, § 40, 16 Stat. 428 (creating government 
institutions for the District of Columbia). 
 492. See Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 92, § 2, 12 Stat. 284 765 (establishing a court 
for the investigation of claims against the United States). 
 493. See District of Columbia v. Eslin, 183 U.S. 62, 63 (1901) (noting that 
Eslin’s claims were against the District of Columbia). If the Klein principle 
against self-dealing as described above does not adequately address the difference 
between these cases, I suggest that it is Eslin rather than Klein that should be 
read narrowly to accommodate the difference between them. Klein aligns better 
with the constitutional self-dealing cases, which restrict Congress’s power to 
benefit itself by changing the law. A broad reading of Klein also comports better 
with Sioux Nation, in which the Court made clear that it was of “obvious 
importance to the Klein holding” that “Congress was attempting to decide the 
controversy in its own favor.” United States v. Sioux Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 405 
(1980). 
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the benefit of the District of Columbia rather than the United 
States. 
Reading Eslin in this way is not free of difficulty.494 Because 
the 1895 jurisdictional statute reopened claims against the District 
and provided a rule of decision for the Court of Claims to follow, it 
could be said that the United States took on the obligation to pay 
those claims in 1895, even though it had no obligation in 1874. This 
is perhaps similar to Klein: Congress may not have had an 
obligation to Wilson at the time it enacted the ACPA, but it surely 
did after Padelford, in which its obligations to pardoned 
southerners were clarified.495 There is an apparent incongruity in 
characterizing the government’s obligations in Klein in formalist 
terms (the government had the obligation to Klein after Padelford 
whether or not it was correctly decided) while characterizing the 
government’s obligation in Eslin in functionalist terms (Eslin’s 
claim remained one against the District despite Congress’s formal 
assumption of the debt in the 1895 act).  
But, despite this challenge, understanding the 1895 expansion 
of jurisdiction as a gratuitous act that created no obligation on the 
part of the United States is the best way to make sense of the 
results in Eslin and Klein. In both cases, the Court distinguished 
between gratuitous acts and obligations. In Eslin, the Court held 
that the 1895 statute, by which the United States agreed to pay 
the higher Board Rate, was “an act of grace upon the part of the 
United States.”496 As a result, Congress was later free to withhold 
its grace and deny Eslin’s claims.497 By contrast, the Klein Court 
rejected the very same argument. In Klein, the government argued 
that the United States subjects itself to suit “ex gratia”—that is, as 
a matter of grace—and therefore has the right to permit or deny 
suit as it sees fit.498 The Court specifically rejected this argument, 
holding that it is “as much the duty of the government as of 
individuals to fulfill its obligations.”499  
                                                                                                     
 494. A special thanks to Evan Caminker for suggesting this point. 
 495. See United States v. Padelford, 76 U.S. 531, 533 (1869) (broadly 
interpreting the ACPA to include claims like those in Klein). 
 496. Eslin, 183 U.S. at 65. 
 497. Id. at 66. 
 498. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128, 135 (1871). 
 499. Id. at 144. The gratuity/obligation distinction made in Eslin and Klein 
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Given the striking similarities between Eslin and Klein, the 
difference between them seems to be only that the Court viewed 
the ACPA in Klein as an obligation and the 1895 statute in Eslin 
as a gratuity. And this gratuity/obligation distinction explains the 
results in both cases if (and perhaps only if) the Eslin Court viewed 
Congress’s assumption of the District’s debts as something other 
than an obligation of the United States. The judgment rendered by 
the Court of Claims in Klein was an obligation of the government 
because of the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the ACPA in 
Padelford, which required the United States to pay the class of 
claims that included Klein’s claim.500 By contrast, when Congress 
agreed to pay the debts of the District of Columbia, it did so not out 
of legal obligation, but rather moral obligation. And this 
undertaking did not create a legal obligation because it was ex 
gratia, merely an “act of grace,” to take on the debts incurred by 
another entity.501 As a result, Congress had no legal obligation to 
pay these debts, even after it agreed to pay them in 1895. On this 
reading, the Court upheld the Eslin appropriation proviso because 
it did not abrogate an obligation owed by the government within 
the meaning of the Klein self-dealing principle. Eslin is, in other 
words, less like Klein than it is like Schooner Peggy, in which 
Congress conferred a benefit on a person other than the United 
States itself.502 In the language of Corollary A, the change in law 
inured to the benefit of the District rather than the government; 
as a result, the Court correctly applied the change in law.503  
Eslin raises a final point. Distinguishing between Klein and 
Eslin based on the Court’s distinction between a gratuity and an 
                                                                                                     
continues to exist in other areas of the law.  See Burkhardt v. United States, 113 
Ct. Cl. 658, 666 (1949) (identifying the distinction between payments made out of 
legal and moral obligation); Granite State Ins. Co. v. ACE Am. Reinsurance Co., 
849 N.Y.S.2d 201, 203 (2007) (noting that an “ex gratia” payment is “one made by 
a party that recognizes no legal obligation to pay”). 
 500. See United States v. Padelford, 76 U.S. 531, 533 (1869) (broadly 
interpreting the ACPA to include claims like those in Klein). 
 501. District of Columbia v. Eslin, 183 U.S. 62, 65 (1901). 
 502. See United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. 103, 104–05 (1801) 
(upholding change in law that benefitted a party other than the government). 
 503. See id. (upholding change in law that benefitted a party other than the 
government); United States v. Sioux Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 404–05 (same); Pope 
v. United States, 323 U.S. 1, 14 (1944) (same). 
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obligation suggests that the government can obligate itself in a 
way that cannot lawfully be undone, but that not every 
government promise is irrevocable. This is not novel; we have seen 
the Court make this distinction already in Winstar, United States 
Trust, and Carmell.504 But, the gratuity/obligation distinction 
suggests an important unanswered question: under the Klein 
self-dealing principle formulated above, what types of obligations 
will the government be forced to honor? The possibility of broad 
and narrow formulations of the Klein self-dealing principle are 
discussed below, in which the principle is applied to hypothetical 
future cases. 
V. The Klein Self-Dealing Principle Applied to Future Cases 
The Klein self-dealing principle articulated above can help 
lower courts approach future cases that implicate legislative 
interference in the judicial process.505 The principle can resolve 
some recurring problems easily. Consider the federal statute 
enacted to resolve the debate over Terri Schiavo.506 While Schiavo 
lay in a persistent vegetative state for a decade, her parents and 
husband engaged in a protracted legal battle in state court over 
whether she would have wished to be kept alive by artificial 
means.507 After the court ordered the hospice facility in which she 
resided to withhold food and water, Congress enacted Terri’s Law, 
which permitted “any parent” of Terri Schiavo to bring suit in 
federal district court to redress the decision to withhold her life 
support.508 Through Terri’s Law, Congress set aside the previous 
decade of state court litigation over Schiavo’s intentions, 
                                                                                                     
 504. See United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 896–97 (1996) 
(invalidating statute reflecting government self-interest); U.S. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. 
New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 25–26 (1977) (same); Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 533 
n.23 (2000) (same). 
 505. See infra Part V (applying principle against self-dealing to future cases).  
 506. See Act for the Relief of the Parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo, Pub. L. 
No. 109-3, 119 Stat. 15, 15–16 (2005) (providing special exemption for named 
individuals from generally applicable jurisdictional rules). 
 507. In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 780 So. 2d 176, 177, 180 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2001). 
 508. See Pub. L. No. 109-3, 119 Stat. 15, 15–16 (providing a special rule that 
applied to two people only). 
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permitting relitigation of previously adjudicated issues.509 Limited 
to one event, and providing relief for two people only, Terri’s Law 
provided a special exemption from generally applicable preclusion 
rules that otherwise apply to suits in district court.510 Although 
Terri’s Law interfered with the normal fact-finding process, 
eliciting considerable scholarly criticism,511 it did not run afoul of 
a Klein principle against self-dealing because it did not benefit the 
government in a pending case. 
Analysis of Terri’s Law reveals that a Klein self-dealing 
principle is not an all-powerful tool to protect the judiciary from 
the legislature; nor does it prevent Congress from picking winners 
and losers in particular cases generally. It is possible, of course, to 
imagine a stronger limitation on the legislative power—one that 
would prevent Congress from singling out individuals for special 
treatment. I have argued elsewhere that such a rule is supportable 
and desirable.512 Nevertheless, such a rule would require a 
wholesale abandonment of rule of decision doctrine and is, 
therefore, outside the scope of this Article’s inquiry.  
But, even though it stays largely, if not entirely, within the 
constraints of doctrine, the Klein self-dealing principle articulated 
above provides a meaningful check on legislative intrusion into the 
judicial function. The following hypothetical cases reveal the power 
and limitations of a Klein self-dealing principle. These 
hypotheticals also answer the questions raised above about the 
application of the “substantial part” standard and the kinds of 
government promises that can be considered obligations.513 For 
                                                                                                     
 509. See id. (permitting a suit over previously litigated issues). 
 510. Id. 
 511. See Caminker, supra note 11, at 529 (arguing that if Terri’s Law does not 
violate Klein by “impermissibly dictating to the federal courts a rule of decision,” 
then Klein must be “virtually impossible to violate”).  
 512.  There are historical, textual, and jurisprudential reasons to conclude 
that the Constitution disfavors targeted legislation like Terri’s Law. See Zoldan, 
Reviving Legislative Generality, supra note 112, at 690 (suggesting that Terri’s 
Law violates a principle of legislative generality). Moreover, stronger protection 
against targeted legislation is attractive because of its association with 
corruption, punishment without trial, and unjustified unequal treatment. See 
Zoldan, The Equal Protection Component, supra note 112, at 500–01, 510–18 
(describing costs of special legislation). 
 513. See supra Parts IV.C.1–2 (noting unanswered questions about the scope 
of a Klein principle against self-dealing).  
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each case, consider the following excerpt from the hypothetical 
federal statute, the “No Structures in Public Streams Act:” 
“§ 1. No structure that impedes wildlife may be built in a 
public stream. 
 § 2.   Any person may bring an action in federal district court 
to enforce this Act.” 
A. Case A—The Local Power Amendment 
After the No Structures in Public Streams Act became law, the 
United States Army Corps of Engineers, which is authorized by 
statute to maintain navigable channels in the United States, built 
a dam in the Huron River to generate power for the local 
community. Fred Fisherman brought suit under the Act to require 
the Army Corps to remove the dam. Fred demonstrated that the 
Huron is a public stream and that the dam impeded salmon in the 
river; accordingly, Fred prevailed before the district court. The 
Corps appealed. While the appeal was pending, Congress enacted 
the Local Power Amendment, which amended the Act by adding 
the following language to section 1: “provided that, no structure 
that is built for the purpose of generating power to serve the local 
community impedes wildlife within the meaning of this Act.” 
The Klein self-dealing principle would not prevent the Court 
of Appeals from applying the Local Power Amendment. The 
general rule provides that the court must apply the law to cases 
pending on appeal at the time of the change.514 The Klein exception 
would apply only if the Amendment reflects governmental 
self-dealing, that is, if the Amendment has the effect of benefitting 
the government as a party in the case that is pending.515 In order 
to answer this question, the court would have to determine 
whether the Amendment has the effect of abrogating an obligation 
owed by the government in a way that is not merely incidental to 
the accomplishment of a broader governmental objective.516 The 
                                                                                                     
 514. See United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 104–05 
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 515. See United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 896–97 (1996) 
(invalidating statute reflecting government self-interest); U.S. Tr. Co. of N.Y. v. 
New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 25–26 (1977) (same); Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 533 
n.23 (same). 
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court would examine whether the Amendment necessarily benefits 
the government and whether a substantial part of the impact of 
the change in law is to relieve the government of its obligation.517  
Assuming that the requirement to refrain from building 
structures in public streams is an “obligation” within the meaning 
of Klein (an assumption I will question below), applying the 
Amendment will relieve the government of its obligation by 
permitting the Army Corps’s dam. However, the abrogation of the 
government’s obligation is incidental to the accomplishment of a 
broader governmental objective within the meaning of the Klein 
self-dealing principle. First, the Amendment will not necessarily 
relieve the government of its obligation to refrain from building a 
dam. To take advantage of the amendment, the government will 
have to demonstrate that the purpose of the dam is to generate 
power for the local community. In the absence of such a showing, 
the government would not be relieved of its obligation. The 
requirement that the government make a demonstration to take 
advantage of the change in law preserves a small, but important 
role for the judiciary in the adjudication process.518 Second, the 
court would likely find that relieving the government of its 
obligation is not a substantial part of the effect of the Amendment. 
Because it applies to any number of locations, the Amendment 
does far more than allow the government to build this particular 
dam. And, because it applies to all structures built for power 
generation, it does more than provide an exemption for the 
government alone. As a result, the Amendment’s abrogation of the 
government’s obligation is incidental to the accomplishment of a 
broader governmental objective and it is not prohibited by the 
Klein self-dealing principle. 
Case A provides a relatively easy example of the difference 
between a statute that amends applicable law and one that 
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 517. See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 146 (1871) 
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provides a rule of decision in pending cases. As described above, a 
viable Klein principle depends on the ability to meaningfully 
distinguish between these concepts.519 A number of scholars, and 
Chief Justice Roberts, have argued that there is no space between 
them and, therefore, the Changed Law Rule swallows the Klein 
rule of decision principle altogether.520 But, viewed in light of a 
principle against self-dealing, the Changed Law Rule can be read 
more narrowly to mean that a statute amends applicable law only 
when it achieves a governmental objective other than simply 
relieving the government of its obligations—in other words—when 
it sets policy. By contrast, a change in law that does little more 
than relieve the government of an obligation does not amend 
applicable law within the meaning of Klein.  
Is it possible to distinguish a statute that sets policy from one 
that does not? At the margins, it surely is difficult to parse statutes 
to determine whether they set policy. But the Klein self-dealing 
principle, as applied to Case A, suggests some basic parameters for 
making this distinction. A change in law like the Local Power 
Amendment sets policy because it applies generally to an 
indeterminate number of locations and an indeterminate class of 
dam builders. In short, it appears to be setting a policy to 
encourage power production. As a result, it changes applicable law 
within the meaning of the Changed Law Rule. In the language of 
Corollary B, because the Local Power Amendment does more than 
relieve the government of an obligation, it amends applicable law 
and must be applied by the court.521 
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B. Case B—The Federal Dam Power Amendment 
Imagine again that Congress passed the No Structures in 
Public Streams Act, the Corps built its dam, and Fred successfully 
brought suit for its removal. This time, while the appeal was 
pending, Congress enacted the Federal Dam Power Amendment, 
which added the following language to section 1: “provided that, no 
structure built by the federal government for the purpose of 
generating power to serve the local community impedes wildlife 
within the meaning of this Act.” As in Case A, the Klein 
self-dealing question turns on whether the Amendment abrogated 
an obligation of the government in a way that was merely 
incidental to the accomplishment of a broader governmental 
objective. And again, the court will consider whether the 
Amendment necessarily benefits the government or if a 
substantial part of the impact of the change in law is to relieve the 
government of its obligation.  
This is a much closer case under the Klein self-dealing 
principle than Case A. Like Case A, and for the same reason, the 
Federal Dam Power Amendment will not necessarily relieve the 
government of its obligation. But, unlike Case A, the Amendment 
abrogated the government’s—and only the government’s—
obligation. This example brings into sharp focus the difficulty of 
determining, at the margins, whether a substantial part of the 
impact of a statute is to relieve the government of an obligation. 
On one hand, it is a perfectly cogent policy to suggest that the 
government, but not private parties, should be permitted to 
generate power. On the other hand, the concentration of the impact 
on federal obligations suggests self-relief from Fred’s suit and suits 
like it.  
The Klein self-dealing principle does not provide an easy 
answer to this difficult question. Whether a “substantial part” of 
the impact of the statute is to relieve the government of an 
obligation is necessarily a question of degree rather than 
category.522 And the very fact that “substantial part” is a standard 
rather than a categorical rule means that there will be close cases. 
But the fact that the phrase “substantial part” is indefinite does 
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not make it meaningless. Courts interpret and apply indefinite 
standards, like the term “substantial part,” in many contexts,523 
including when it makes self-dealing determinations.524  
In Winstar, the Court held that the government was liable for 
breaching an agreement over the regulatory treatment of debt 
because Congress’s repudiation of the government’s agreement 
was self-dealing.525 Although the statute had far reaching 
consequences, the government was engaged in self-relief because 
“a substantial part of the impact” of the government’s breach of 
promise fell “on its own contractual obligations.”526 In making this 
determination, the Court considered the number of government 
agreements that would be nullified, the significant costs that 
would be shifted to private parties, evidence that the purpose of 
the statute was to violate contractual obligations, and the lack of 
evidence of any purpose other than to relieve the government of an 
obligation.527 A substantial part analysis, like the Court’s analysis 
in Winstar, provides a framework for courts to decide even difficult 
cases, like the case of the Federal Dam Power Amendment. As in 
Winstar, the court could consider the extent of relief it provides to 
the government from its previous obligations, the extent to which 
private parties would bear the cost of the Amendment, and 
evidence of the purpose of the statute.  
Comparing cases A and B also helps resolve the vexing 
problem of Klein’s relationship with particularized legislation. As 
noted, the Court has often expressed concern with particularized 
legislation. Indeed, in Hurtado, the Court stated unequivocally 
that “a special rule for a particular person or a particular case” 
cannot properly be considered “law.”528 Nevertheless, the modern 
Court gives little weight to arguments based on specificity in the 
Klein context, in part because of the difficulty in determining 
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whether a statute is impermissibly targeted.529 The Klein 
self-dealing principle avoids this dilemma by assuming that 
legislation that affects only private parties, even if particularized, 
is implementing a broad governmental objective. Compare Case B 
to Bank Markazi: in Bank Markazi, the statute at issue made the 
assets of the Bank available to satisfy judgments against Iran.530 
On one hand, the statute was special to one case, designated by 
name, and to one defendant.531 On the other hand, the statute 
resolved claims by hundreds of claimants. But then again, the 
claimants were already known at the time the statute was 
enacted.532 The difficulty in determining whether a large but closed 
class was impermissibly targeted led the Court to downplay the 
constitutional infirmity of targeted legislation.533 By focusing on 
governmental self-dealing, however, the Klein self-dealing 
principle eliminates the difficult line-drawing question for cases 
between private parties. Only when the government is a party is 
particularity an issue. Put another way, the Klein self-dealing 
principle accommodates the decision in Bank Markazi, but 
confines it to circumstances in which the government is not a 
party. When the government is a party, consistent with Hurtado 
and Winstar, legislative generality remains an important part of 
the self-dealing analysis. 
C. Case C—The Huron Dam Project Amendment 
Finally, imagine again that Congress passed the No 
Structures in Public Streams Act, the Corps built its dam, and 
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Fred successfully brought suit for its removal. This time, while the 
appeal was pending, Congress enacted the Huron Dam Project 
Amendment, which added the following language to section 1: 
“provided that, no structure that is described in the pending case 
of Fisherman v. United States Army Corps of Engineers impedes 
wildlife within the meaning of this Act.” Again, the self-dealing 
test provides a framework for resolving the constitutionality of this 
amendment.534 Applying the Klein self-dealing principle, the court 
will ask whether the Amendment has the effect of abrogating an 
obligation owed by the government in a way that is not merely 
incidental to the accomplishment of a broader governmental 
objective. The court will examine whether the Amendment 
necessarily benefits the government and whether a substantial 
part of the impact of the change in law is to relieve the government 
of its obligation. 
Case C is most likely to violate a Klein self-dealing principle 
of the three cases described. By exempting the Huron Dam Project 
alone from the Act, the Amendment abrogates a government 
obligation in a way that is not merely incidental to the 
achievement of a broader governmental objective as defined by the 
self-dealing test. Unlike Cases A and B, the Huron River Dam 
Amendment necessarily benefits the government. There is no role 
for the court other than to enter judgment for the government; the 
court is cut completely out of the process of adjudicating the 
dispute between the government and Fred. As a result, it is a 
foregone conclusion that the government will win the pending case. 
Moreover, a substantial part of the impact of the change in law is 
to benefit the government. Unlike Case A, the Huron Dam 
Amendment cannot be described as setting policy. The 
Amendment does not encourage power generation generally; nor 
does it even permit the government broad leeway to generate 
power. Rather, the Amendment provides only a benefit to the 
government in one particular, pending case. Because the 
Amendment does not achieve a government objective other than to 
benefit the government in a particular, pending case, it is likely 
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self-dealing within the meaning of the Klein self-dealing principle 
and therefore invalid. 
Comparing Case C with Cases A and B reveals a few final 
points about the Klein self-dealing principle. First, Case C brings 
to the fore a question reserved earlier: what types of government 
obligations will the government be forced to honor. In Klein, the 
obligation that the government abrogated was an obligation to pay 
money.535 The fact that only money was at stake makes Klein a 
natural fit with the other self-dealing cases that implicate the 
government’s financial obligations, like Winstar, Perry, and United 
States Trust.536 On one hand, it makes sense to limit a Klein 
self-dealing principle to financial obligations. When the 
government’s choice is binary—to pay or not to pay a claim—a 
court’s decision to require the government to pay is a limited 
intrusion on a government decision. Indeed, Congress has already 
undertaken to pay claims on the Treasury by waiving its sovereign 
immunity through the Tucker Act.537 A court order to the 
government to pay a claim that Congress has tried to nullify 
through self-dealing is consistent with the general policy set out by 
the Tucker Act to pay claims against the government.538 A Klein 
self-dealing principle that considers the government bound only by 
its financial obligations would be easy to apply without intruding 
on policymaking. Although a Klein principle limited to financial 
obligations is important, it would fail to prevent situations like 
Case C. 
On the other hand, it is possible to conceive of a Klein principle 
that applies to non-financial obligations as well as financial 
obligations. This broader reading is suggested by Carmell, which 
prevented the government from undoing a non-financial 
obligation.539 Although courts might be chary of invalidating 
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statutes that breach non-financial obligations, the Klein 
self-dealing principle articulated above would keep courts from 
crossing the line into policymaking. The Klein self-dealing 
principle prevents self-dealing only in pending cases, does not 
prevent the government from abrogating its obligations if there is 
a broader governmental objective, and provides a framework for 
determining whether there is a broader governmental objective.540 
As a result, courts can apply the Klein self-dealing principle in 
non-financial, as well as financial, cases without fear that they will 
intrude on government policy. By definition, so long as the 
government is setting policy through its change in law, the court 
will apply it. For example, even under the broader rendering of the 
Klein self-dealing principle, Congress could easily authorize the 
Army Corps to build a dam in the Huron River. For example, it 
could repeal the No Structures in Public Streams Act altogether; 
permit anyone to build a structure in the Huron River; or, as 
described in Case A, permit anyone to build a dam anywhere for 
power generation purposes. Although a viable Klein principle that 
only applied to financial obligations would be worth preserving, its 
application outside the context of financial obligations serves as an 
additional important restraint on government action. 
Second, as Case C suggests, it is not necessary to look to 
Congress’s motives to find a Klein violation. Although self-dealing 
may often elide with corruption, the two need not be joined. 
Designating an act as self-dealing is not a moral statement about 
the intention of the self-dealer, but rather a statement about the 
status of the self-dealer; that is, a self-dealer is merely an entity in 
the position to exercise a public power for private benefit. By 
stripping self-dealing of its moral stigma, a court can apply a Klein 
principle against self-dealing based solely on the impact of the 
statute rather than the motivation of the body that enacted it. A 
court would not have to impugn a legislature to find that a statute 
violated Klein; nor would a court need to search legislative 
materials to find evidence of a corrupt motivation to make the 
Klein assessment. 
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VI. Conclusion 
Defining the contours of Klein’s rule of decision principle has 
vexed courts and scholars for generations. The puzzle of Klein 
persists not only because it is doctrinally challenging, but because 
it implicates the most basic, irresolvable questions about the line 
separating Congress from the courts. Conceptualizing Klein as an 
implementation of a principle against self-dealing reveals that it 
can serve as a model for the relationship between the individual 
and the government. A properly stated Klein principle 
acknowledges Congress’s broad powers and recognizes the 
impracticality of second-guessing Congress’s methods of achieving 
legitimate goals. However, it also recognizes that a legislature of 
the people does not merit deference in all cases. By helping to carve 
the indistinct line demarcating the boundaries of legislative power, 
Klein recognizes that securing justice from a government 
comprised of people, comprised of us, with all of our weaknesses, 
requires continuous vigilance. Seen in this light, Klein is an 
embodiment of Madison’s ever-timely exhortation: “In framing a 
government which is to be administered by men over men, the 
great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government 
to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control 
itself.”541  
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